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The Power of Congress over Courts in
Nonfederal Cases
Louise Weinberg*

We really have no clear idea about what the power of
Congress is over the jurisdiction of courts. This obscurity may
even lend the subject an uncanny interest, like the London fog
in one of Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories. But as long as
good theory eludes us we will be stumbling along like so many
Dr. Watsons, without a clue.
My starting point here (but only a starting point) is the
hitherto little-discussed question of national power to confer
jurisdiction upon the state courts over cases that do not arise
under federal law. This odd question is now raised by a
proposal by the American Law Institute for federally-conferred
state-court jurisdiction over mass torts.' In this article I will
The Proposal
have little to say about the Proposal ~pecifically.~
furnishes pretty barren ground for thinking about the question
with which I began. For one thing, it would devolve this
controversial jurisdiction upon state courts only with their
ons sent.^ Even supposing that a state would consent, if nicely

* Wynne Professor in Civil Jurisprudence, The University of Texas. I am
grateful to Rex Lee for his invitation to me to contribute a n article to this special
issue of the BYU Law Review.
1. COMPLEXLITIGATION:
STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ANALYSISWITH
REPORTERSSTUDY: A MODEL SYSTEM FOR STATE-TO-~TATE
TRANSFER AND
CONSOLIDATION
("ALI Proposal" or "Proposal"), $9 4.01, 5.01 (1994) [hereinafter
COMPLEX
LITIGATIONPROPOSAL]. The Institute proposes, among other things, that
Congress authorize the discretionary removal of both federal and state mass-tort
cases, without regard to the citizenship of the parties; and transfer of such cases,
not only to a single federal court, but alternatively to a consenting state court,
which would have the needed federal procedural and remedial powers to deal with
the consolidated cases. Id.
2. The most comprehensive consideration of the Proposal's possible
constitutional and other infirmities is Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWAL.
REV. 1029 (1993).
3. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 1, $3 4.01(a)(3), 5.01(d).
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asked, to such crowding, trouble, and expense, the provision for
consent can only clutter the argument I want to make.
So I will be tackling broader questions. I will begin with
the general subject of national power over state-court
jurisdiction in nonfederal cases, a power the exercise of which
the ALI Proposal presents only one model. I will move on to
examine the underlying problem in its more familiar context, in
which Congress confers jurisdiction upon federal courts over
state-law eases; here, my effort will be to show not merely that
theory developed for the former context can be generalized to
extend to the latter, but that the theory is simply part of a
more general theory of the power of Congress which has long
been substantially, if implicitly, understood.
It probably has been one of our mistakes that we tend to
separate the two sets of courts in our minds. As a subject of
separate study each set of courts, state or federal, must
inevitably be a somewhat artificial construct. After all, the two
sets of courts comprise one legal system. Of course there are
pockets of exclusive jurisdiction in each judicial system. We
know Article I11 imposes limits on the Article I powers of
Congress in dealing with federal, but not with state courts.
Then, too, there are the prudential policies that encourage
federal courts to turn certain cases away. Those things said,
surely the preferred position should be one of general
jurisdictional congruence. When litigants are sent shuffling
from one set of courts to the other to forage for a piece of
missing jurisdiction we are not deluded into thinking it an
example of efficiency or even fairness in the administration of
.~
we know about federal supremacy on
civil j ~ s t i c e Whatever

4. The Supreme Court contemplates bifurcated litigation in such recent
interesting cases as California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (holding
unrealistically that claims of indirect purchasers, lacking "antitrust standing" under
federal case law, do not conflict with federal policy favoring the claims of direct
purchasers and therefore may be pursued on state-law theories, even if the
consequences include bifurcated litigation); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that federal courts sitting in equity in
civil-rights cases have no pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims,
notwithstanding that this would lead to bifurcated litigation). For comment on this
aspect of Pennhurst, see David Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment
and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); see also Louise Weinberg,
The New Judicial Federalism: Where We Are Now, 19 GA. L. REV. 1075 (1985). For
comment on this aspect of ARC America, see Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State
Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX.L. REV. 1743, 1760-72 (1992). For an
effort to patch up the wreckage in the wake of ARC America, see Barry Hawk et
al., Report of the M A Section on Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme
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the one hand and Erie on the other also suggests that focusing
narrowly on either set of courts may give us skew theory.
We have made other problems for ourselves. The Supreme
Court has given us a body of jurisprudence that makes the
subject of national power over the state courts an obligatory
part of any serious course on federal courts; but our thinking
has never extended much beyond federal-law cases. We see the
supremacy of federal law as the driving force, and the
correlative duty of state courts to apply federal law as the
feature that makes the subject eye-opening.5 Yet we still do
not have a reasonably clear idea of the power of the nation
even in this traditional context. We are unclear about where
the duty of the state courts under the Supremacy Clause begins
and end$ and about where to locate constitutional controls on
state procedures and remedies in these federal-law cases.?
As for state-law cases, it has been the convention to
emphasize the power of Congress to confer8 jurisdiction over

Court's Decision in California v. ARC America Corp., 59 ANTITRUST
L.J. 273 (1990)
(criticizing the case and suggesting legislative override; recommending in the
alternative, among other things, that a state be recognized as a "citizen" for
diversity purposes in parens patriae indirect-purchaser actions; and remarking that
Congress could confer federal jurisdiction "by invoking the concept of protective
jurisdiction. Under this theory, Congress can confer federal jurisdiction over purely
state-law claims simply by enacting a jurisdictional statute.").
5. If you were wondering how it happens that state courts enforce the
federal civil rights statutes, you might consult the classic, if mundane, case of
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding under the Supremacy Clause that state
courts are not free to decline jurisdiction over a federal claim arbitrarily); see also
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (same; states adjudicating federal civil-rights
cases against local authorities may not dismiss even when the defendants have
sovereign immunity under state law); and see F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
760 (1982) (holding that Congress has Commerce power to require state
administrative tribunals to adjudicate disputes arising under federal standards).
6. For critiques of the jurisprudence of supremacy, see infra notes 100-02,
189.
7. For the debate on whether the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment controls
the validity of service of process in state courts adjudicating federal questions, see
infra note 116 and accompanying text.
8. I pass over the enduring debate on the power of Congress to limit the
jurisdiction of federal courts, see, e.g., Gordon G. Young, A Critical Reassessment of
the Case Law Bearing on Congress's Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower
Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132 (1995); Barry Friedman, Federal Jurisdiction
and Legal Scholarship: A (Dialogic) Reply, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 478 (1991); Michael
Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction, 85
Nw. U. L. REV. 465 (1991). The position i s reasonably clear, see Gerald Gunther,
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to
the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984) (arguing that the power of
Congress is virtually plenary).
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state-law cases on federal rather than state courts. Article I11
limits the power of Congress over federal, not state courts; and
it is hard to see a problem of comparable interest in the state
courts. But in my view this traditional emphasis upon Article
I11 has obscured theoretical understanding.
Why, then, do I take the bait on this occasion and begin by
isolating and focusing on one set of courts only, the state
courts? The real object of this paper is to shed light on the
classic Article I11 problem of federal courts by generalizing it in
advance. By deleting Article I11 from the picture we can
consider national jurisdictional policies that may exist without
Article 111. It is then a further question whether Article I11
reflects or is surrogate for these more general concerns or
represents some additional limit on the power of Congress.
My argument, spelled out in the remainder of this article,
can be summarized here. I begin the excursion in terra
incognita: the little-explored power of Congress over the
jurisdiction of state courts in matters likely to arise under
nonfederal law: state law, or perhaps foreign law. It turns out
that, surprisingly, there are many ways in which Congressg or
the Supreme Court1' or both can and do act with impact upon
the jurisdiction of the states over even nonfederal business.
Sometimes this impact seems incidental, sometimes integral to
the national purpose. But when the nation acts in ways having
impact upon state courts in matters of apparently little
national concern, whether by inadvertency or by design, the
national intervention in state jurisdiction will have legitimacy

The important insight has always been that due process ultimately requires
state if not federal jurisdiction. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV.L. REV.
1362 (1953).But today the Supreme Court not infrequently struggles a t the brink
of total ouster of jurisdiction in all courts. See generally LOUISE WEINBERG,1996
SUPPLEMENT
78-94 (1995)to FEDERALCOURTS:CASESAND COMMENTS
ON JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM
AND JUDICIAL
POWER (1994).
9. When I say "the power of Congress," I should be read-unless the context
precludes it-as referring to the power of the nation, including the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court cannot enact a positive grant of jurisdiction, but as a practical
matter its rulings can so affect the jurisdiction of either set of courts that the
question of its power is bound up with the question of national power generally.
10. When I say "the Supreme Court," I mean to be understood as saying
"courts." I would prefer to use "courts" because it more accurately captures the
way issues of law, even issues of allocations of power between the nation and the
states, must be decided in courts of first instance, even in state courts. But here I
use "the Supreme Court" when I need to convey that the courts are exercising
national power.
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only to the extent that there is some identifiable national
interest or interests that support that result.
In other words, the ultimate source of national power over
nonfederal law in the state courts, as over everything else,
must be an identifiable national interest. Further, the scope of
national power over nonfederal adjudication in state courts is
presumptively co-extensive with the national interest so
identified? The weaker the interest the weaker the
interference. In the strong instance in which Congress
expressly confers new jurisdiction upon state courts over
nonfederal questions, the inchoate national interest in and
power over federalizable but unfederalized law generally, but
not always, authorizes the assertion of national power to confer
such jurisdiction.
I argue, further, that within these limits the nation can
and already does bestow not only jurisdiction on the state
courts, but also procedural and remedial powers; these latter
phenomena have interesting implications for our understandings of the nature of due process review of state
procedures.
Further, the state courts, in turn, come under a
proportionate duty to effectuate the national jurisdictional
interest. The source of that duty is the Supremacy Clause, even
when the jurisdiction that the nation has devolved upon the
states is jurisdiction over state-law issues--contrary to what
might have been supposed.
Further, because national power ends where the national
interest ends, the nation must have a rational basis for-a
legitimate governmental interest in-a federal law or decision
that constrains or enlarges state jurisdiction over nonfederal
issues. This requirement of a rational basis is an absolute,

11. This assertion is particularly controversial. That national power might be
coextensive with the national interest is not self-evident. For a fine student
exposition of the problem, see Alan R. Greenspan, Note, The Constitutional Exercise
of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach To Federalism, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 1019, 1020 (1988) (arguing that deference to rational exercises of Congress's
Commerce power has given to the central government general police powers
properly reserved to the states). If only to protect the existence of reasonably
autonomous states, we are schooled to think of national power, rather, a s under
special constraints-as opposed to state power, which (except for powers delegated
to the nation) we are schooled to think of as plenary. When I use the limiting
word "presumptively" in the text I do not refer to these supposed special
constraints on federal power, but rather to general constitutional principles
constraining exercises of state as well as federal power.
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however liberal, limit upon national power. It is a constraint of
substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment, in the
sense in which the Due Process Clauses protect against
arbitrary or irrational governmental action.12
Finally, although there are always extrinsic constitutional
constraints on any exercise of national power-constraints
deriving from the equal protection principle, the First
Amendment, and other fundamental safeguards against
power-the constraint of substantive due process, contrary to
what might have been supposed, is intrinsic to the existence of
national power. In addition, this constraint of substantive due
process under the Fifth Amendment provides the only
significant intrinsic limit on national power to affect state
jurisdiction over nonfederal business. In this context the Tenth

12. This traditional form of substantive due process should be distinguished
from the Lochner-era incorporation into the Due Process Clause of "liberty of
contract," see HOWARDGILLMAN,THE CONSTITUTIONBESIEGED:THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNERERA POLICEPOWERSJURISPRUDENCE
(1993) (exploring the
possible unity of the two concepts). The general legitimacy of rational exercises of
governmental power was perceived and defended in the Lochner era from Lochnerstyle assault. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (supporting as reasonable an economic regulation supposedly affecting
liberty of contract); cf: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 377-78, 38283 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Is the subject-matter within the reasonable
scope of regulation? Is the end legitimate? . . . If so, the act must be
sustained . . . .").
Rather, this form of substantive due process is the standard "rational-basis"
scrutiny both the Constitution and the common law give, a t a minimum, to law
under challenge. I t is an easy test, but law that is arbitrary or irrational should
flunk it. The classic references are United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938), and Justice Douglas's opinion in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955). For other contexts, see infra notes 120, 137-45 and
accompanying text. For recent writing, see R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of
Legislative Fit Under Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech
Doctrine: Separating Questions of Advancement, Relationship and Burden, 28 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1279 (1994); Charles B. Blackmar, Neutral Principles and
Substantive Due Process, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 511 (1991); Robert E. Riggs,
Substantive Dud Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (1990).
The other side of this coin, of course, is that jurisdiction devolved arbitrarily or
capriciously, like all other irrational exercises of governmental power, is illegitimate
and will be struck down. Cf. the analogy of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. $0 702, 706(2)(A) (providing federal judicial review for arbitrary and
capricious federal agency action).
(References to Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., are sometimes accompanied by
references to Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929) (Holmes, J.). This relentlessly
ophthalmological string of citations probably comes down to us from an overly
specific bit of long-ago research. There is no necessary connection between
eyeglasses and rational-basis scrutiny.)
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Amendment, Article 111, and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment are all substantially irrelevant.
Once we can begin to see general theory emerging from
this particular context, unobscured by the special problems
presented by Article 111, we can then turn to the more familiar
problem of the Article I power of Congress as it may conflict
with Article 111. I argue that the analysis offered in this paper
provides more convincing theory than we now have on the
classic problem of the power of Congress to vest federal
jurisdiction over state-law claims without regard to the
citizenship of the parties. Just as Congress may devolve upon
the state courts jurisdiction over nonfederal business in the
presence of a national jurisdictional interest, so may Congress
confer such jurisdiction upon the federal courts.
The analysis offered here implies that substantive due
process must be satisfied before any independent Article I11
question can be reached. Further, it is possible that Article I11
itself may be satisfied by a substantive due process inquiry. In
other words, perhaps even for Article I11 purposes, nondiverse
federal cases can "arise under" purely jurisdictional statutes,
contrary to what has been supposed. This latter argument is
not essential to my thesis; Article I11 can be regarded as an
independent textual constraint on the power of Congress
without fatally compromising my more fundamental argument;
but in my own view Article I11 is a surrogate for rational-basis
scrutiny.
In Part 11,'~I present a taxonomy of examples of federal
intervention into the jurisdiction of state courts over nonfederal
business, discussing national power over exclusive and
concurrent state jurisdiction, national ouster of state
jurisdiction, and national regulation of state jurisdiction, all in
state-law cases.
In Part 111,14 I explain the counter-intuitive phenomenon
of federal supremacy in the nonfederal cases described in Part
11. With the material in these two Parts before us, we will have
examples of jurisdiction conferred by the nation, the propriety
of which we can consider free from the difficulties Article I11
usually introduces into such an inquiry.

13. Infra notes 20-89 and accompanying text.
14. Infra notes 90-128 and accompanying text.
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In Part IV,15 I consider the sorts of national interests that
might justify intervention in the jurisdiction of state courts.
In Part V,16 I consider whether there might be sources of
national jurisdictional power that are independent from or
cumulative to national substantive interests, sources thought to
be found in constitutional text, and reject these alternatives.
In Part VI,17 I show how reasoning from the national
interest illuminates analogous recent Supreme Court cases
dealing with the jurisdiction of federal courts, cases in which
federal jurisdiction and state jurisdiction are a t least nominally
concurrent. It becomes a t least plausible that Article 111
furnishes not some independent, further test of federal
jurisdiction over nonfederal questions, but rather is more
intelligibly read as reflecting the scope of and limits on the
national interest.
In Part VII,18 I consider some of the objections that might
be raised to the general theory offered in this paper, including
the objection that the theory yields the apparent paradox of
federal-question jurisdiction over the diversity jurisdiction.
In my final remarkslg I conclude that the substantive
due-process limit on national power over the jurisdiction of the
state courts in state-law matters, which I have described as a
theory of the national interest, is a general theory that explains
national power over nonfederal business in federal courts a s
well, and extends in a way that has been long understood, if
only implicitly, to other exercises of national power.

Let us begin with the power of Congress, if any, to confer
jurisdiction upon the states in state cases.
We are inquiring into intervention by the nation in the
litigation of nonfederal matters in state courts. This is an
inquiry that seems not only unpromising, but unreal. We would
not expect to find much case law, and there is very little
literat~re.~'
One is reminded of Dr. Johnson's boast that he
15. Infra notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
16. Infra notes 157-90 and accompanying text.
17. Infra notes 191-236 and accompanying text.
18. Infra notes 237-81 and accompanying text.
19. Infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
20. But see the nice discussion of federally-conferred state diversity
jurisdiction over mass torts in George T. Conway 111, Note, The Consolidation of
Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099 (1987).
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could repeat by heart, in English, a whole chapter of a Danish
book on The Natural History of Iceland: "CHAP. 72, Concerning
snakes. There are no snakes to be met with throughout the
whole island."21
It might be amusing, then, to see the ways in which such
national interventions in state jurisdiction can occur. If we
could find cases raising the question, it would be of a t least
theoretical importance to have some answers. If there is
national power to devolve jurisdiction upon the states over
business unlikely to be federal business, we would like to know
the source of that power. We would like to know whether such
jurisdiction would be compulsory or merely permissive. If this
jurisdiction is compulsory upon the states, we would like to
know what limits might constrain the national power to confer
it. We would like to know if it matters whether or not this
devolved jurisdiction over state business is new to the states or
was previously exercised by them and would be exercised by
them in any event. We would like to know the implications of
this state jurisdiction for our understanding of national power
over federal jurisdiction.
It turns out that national power can be and has been
exercised so as to affect state judicial powers over state law.
Many of the following examples will have some analog among
the more familiar assertions of national power over federal law
in state courts. For this and other reasons, even though both
cases and commentary have for the most part been confined to
this latter question, neither the jurisprudence nor the
literature is without relevance to the discussion.

A. National Power over Exclusive State Jurisdiction i n StateLaw Cases
Before I try to describe the ways in which the nation can
create a head of exclusive state jurisdiction over state law, let
me begin with a caveat. Exclusive jurisdiction is almost always
somewhat fictional. Even though Congress may explicitly place
claims arising under some statute within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, the reality is that sooner or later a claim
falling within exclusive federal jurisdiction will be adjudicated
21. I am indebted to David Gunn, Head of Reference at the Tarlton Law
Library, for finding a reference for the story in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF
QUOTATIONS
279 (3d ed. 1979). This source dates Dr. Johnson's joke at April 13,
1778.
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in a state court anyway. Sooner or later some state court will
adjudicate even a n exclusively federal question, whether by
way of counterclaim, or defense, or trial of a sub-issue, or other
exigency of litigation. True exceptions to concurrent jurisdiction over federal questions are surprisingly rare, and generally
entail exceptions to federal as well as state jurisdiction, as we
shall see.
Exclusive state jurisdiction over state-law claims also turns
out to mean very little as a practical matter. Sooner or later
some federal court will adjudicate such a claim, whether within
its ancillary jurisdiction, or by way of counterclaim, or defense,
or trial of a sub-issue, or other exigency of litigation. In either
set of courts, state law can even furnish a defense to a federal
claim, a t least when the defense is not on the merits. Federal
claims can be dismissed in either set of courts because, for
example, a state statute of limitations has run, or for forum
non conveniens, or because a state judgment is preclusive. True
exceptions to concurrent jurisdiction over state-law questions
are rare. But because state courts are under few SupremacyClause obligations in administering state law, such exceptions
do not tend to strip both sets of courts of power, as do true
exceptions to concurrent jurisdiction over federal-law questions.
What usually distinguishes the truly exclusive state-law
question, as we shall see, is that federal courts have perceived,
or that the Supreme Court has announced, a federal policy, as
a matter of federal common law, of avoiding federal adjudication of that state-law question however it arises.
We do find occasional instances of explicit conferral upon
state courts by Congress of exclusive jurisdiction of a class of
claims arising under state law. One thinks, for example, of the
McCarran-Ferguson
providing that state courts have
exclusive jurisdiction, with governance by state law, over matters relating to the business of insurance. Nothing in the pervasive E R I S A ~is~ intended to change this underlying position;
ERISA explicitly "saves" state-law governance of the business
of insurance.24 We also have the example of the JacksonVanik ~ m e n d m e n t s ,which
~ ~ provide federal benefits in the

22. 15 U.S.C. $8 1011-1015, 1012(a).
23. Employees' Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. $$ 1001-1461.
24. Id. $ ll44(a), (b)(2)(A).
25. Trade Act of 1974 (Jackson-Vanik Amendments), 19 U.S.C. $ 2192 passim.
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form of "trade readjustment allowances" to displaced workers.
Congress places administration of the program in the agencies
of consenting states. What is interesting for our purposes is
that Congress also provides that state courts have the sole
power of judicial review of these trade readjustment allowanc e ~But
. ~ such
~ examples are rare; and we are not always certain whether state law in such instances is intended to operate
of its own force or is incorporated as federal law-bumping the
example out of our category. Finally, in some of these instances
of conferred exclusive state jurisdiction, one cannot discount
the possibility of federal judicial review under the Constitution
or related federal statutory law, even when the litigation may
have the effect of reopening the question supposedly confided to
the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the state court.27
More familiarly, Congress and the Supreme Court implicitly recognize, even if Congress does not explicitly "confer," exclusive state jurisdiction over a variety of claims that seem much
more convincingly to be true state-law claims. This happens,
for example, when the Constitution does not explicitly permit
federal judicial power to extend to a class of preexisting statelaw cases.28Thus, the nation in effect isolates a sphere of ex26. Section 2311(d) of the Trade Act provides:
A determination by a cooperating State agency with respect to entitlement to program benefits . . . is subject to review in the same manner
and to the same extent as determinations under the applicable State law
[regarding unemployment compensation benefits] and only in that manner
and to that extent.
19 U.S.C. 3 2311(d). The Senate Report accompanying the bill explains that this
provision was intended to confide exclusive jurisdiction to the state agencies and
courts, under state law, over allowances to workers of trade readjustment benefits.
S. REP. NO. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., a t 139 (1974) ("The bill would have the
effect of channeling all questions arising from determinations by State agencies
through the normal State review procedure."). Note that this "grant" of exclusive
jurisdiction is only to consenting states.
27. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto. Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477
U.S. 274, 283 (1986) (holding that although review of federal trade readjustment
allowances to displaced workers under the Trade Act of 1974 is committed by Congress to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts, the state agency's process is
judicially reviewable by the Supreme Court).
28. U.S. CONST.art. 111, 5 2, provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens
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clusive jurisdiction for the states in cases arising exclusively
under law that is not federal, when the parties are not within
Article 111's enumeration of judicial powers extending to those
parties. In this way the states can be said to have "exclusive"
jurisdiction over nondiversity, nonfederal claims simply because
the Constitution does not explicitly authorize anything else.
But digging beneath the constitutional text, we can say on a
deeper level that both the constitutional and statutory grants
of federal diversity jurisdiction reflect the narrowness of, and
help us to understand the nature of, the national interest in
federal jurisdiction over some of the cases that arise exclusively
under law that is not federal.
Similarly, when Congress requires that a minimum
amount of money be in controversy before a diversity case may
be heard in federal court-as it has since the First Judiciary
A~t~~-Congress
in effect creates an "exclusive" sphere of state
governance over questions that today arise exclusively under
law that is not federal, even when the parties are of diverse
~itizenship.~'
There is a class of cases in which Congress or the Supreme
Court seems implicitly to expand the area of "exclusive" state
power over state-law issues by interpreting the constitutional
grant of diversity jurisdiction strictly. For example, neither

of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
.
29. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 8 11. The purpose of the original jurisdictional "amount-in-controversy" requirement in diversity cases seems to have been
the political one of accommodating the general interest in limiting the federal judicial role in creditors' suits, and the specific concern of agrarian debtors that they
might be called upon to answer for small debts in remote federal courts. This
debtor interest was in opposition to the view of the Federalists that federal courts
were needed, precisely, to compel payment of debts, including small private debts.
Small private debts were the major part of some British creditors' assets. Just as
the Federalists tended to believe that the importance to the nation's credit of repayment of the public debt outweighed the hardships of a proportional tax upon
the states, so also did they tend to believe that the importance to the nation's
commerce of repayment of private debts, and particularly those private debts held
by foreign creditors, outweighed the hardships imposed upon debtors in difficult
~RGUSON
THE
, POWEROF THE PURSE306-25 (1961); Wythe
times. See E. JAMES
Holt, "To Establish Justice*: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKEL.J. 1421, 1518 (1989).
30. Cf Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (sustaining the power of
Congress to vest only that part of Article I11 diversity jurisdiction that could not
be created by a n assignment of rights).
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Congress nor the Court has recognized diversity jurisdiction
created by assignment of a claim.31 Moreover, the Court held
in Strawbridge u. Curtiss that diversity must be "complete;"
that statutory jurisdiction does not attach to a case in which
one of the parties is not in diversity of citizenship vis-a-vis all
the Court
adverse parties.32 And in the 1973 Zahn
held that each claimant in a federal class action in diversity
must independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount. On the
other hand, in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur u. Cauble," the
Court held that in a federal class action only the named parties
need be of diverse citizenship, in effect extending ancillary
diversity jurisdiction over nondiverse absentee class members,
and thus in theory reducing the scope of "exclusive" state jurisdiction over diversity claims.
In another class of cases, federal courts will decline to
exercise jurisdiction over some state-law diversity claims, as a
prudential matter of federal common law. Those of us familiar
with federal courts issues are aware of the controversial cases
in which federal courts are authorized to "abstain" from exercising their jurisdiction over federal question^.^^ But we do
31. Id. a t 444-49; Judiciary Act of 1789 9 11; 28 U.S.C. 9 1359 (1988). Section 1359 provides that a district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party "by assignment or otherwise has been improperly . . . joined to
invoke the jurisdiction . . . ." Id.
32. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). But see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (sustaining the constitutionality of federal
interpleader in the absence of complete diversity).
33. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). The Supplemental
Jurisdiction Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. 8 1367(b) (Supp. 1993), probably should be read
as overriding Zahn. Cf: Free v. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the statute overrides Zahn, but noting that opinion is divided among the
district courts and among writers).
34. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
35. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts
should dismiss actions seeking injunctions against pending state criminal proceedings); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (holding that federal courts
should abstain in cases in which exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction might interfere with a complex state regulatory scheme); Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts should abstain from
reaching major constitutional questions in cases in which a reinterpretation of state
law might forestall invocation of federal equity powers). For an early discussion of
Younger, see Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV.
1191 (1977). For a comprehensive current survey of the debates over the legitimacy
of federal abstention, see James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to
Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN.L. REV. 1049 (1994). For a n informative entry into one of the major elements of the debate, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Book Review, The Seduction of Deduction: The Allure of and Problems with a Deductive Approach to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 Nw. U . L. REV. 96 (1991) (re-
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not always focus the same intense attention upon cases in
which federal courts are authorized to "abstain" from exercising
their jurisdiction over state questions. Federal courts, for example, avoid adjudicating family-law matters, notwithstanding
diversity of citizenship between the parties, particularly in
equity cases that might oblige them to supervise domestic relations or to gain expertise in local family service agencies.36
Similarly, a federal court may decline to hear a transnational
even
diversity case on the ground of forum non c~nveniens,~?
when the court sits in a state which would adjudicate those
cases.38Arguably within this category is the recent ruling that
federal courts have discretion to abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction in declaratory actions, if they deem abstention
to be in the interest of "considerations of practicality and wise
judicial admini~tration."~~
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,4° an

viewing MARTIN H. REDISH,THE FEDERALCOURTSIN THE POLITICAL
ORDER:JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
AND AMERICAN
POLITICALTHEORY(1% 1)).
36. Although Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), held claims of
intra-familial tort triable in federal diversity courts, Justice White, for the Court,
distinguished cases falling more properly under the traditional "domestic relations
exception* to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 702-04. Federal courts, he reasoned, should
not be in the business of issuing divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees:
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves retention of
jurisdiction by the court and deployment of social workers to monitor
compliance . . . . [Sltate courts are more . . . suited to work of this type
than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and
local government organizations dedicated to handling [such] issues.
Id. a t 704.
37. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
38. The Court has never held federal forum non conveniens doctrine generally
binding upon state courts. Cf. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981
(1994) (holding state courts free to adjudicate transnational admiralty claims a
federal court would dismiss for forum non conveniens); I n re Air Crash Disaster
Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that federal courts in
the Fifth Circuit are not bound in diversity cases by state laws declining to recognize forum non conveniens).
39. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137, 2143 (1995) (O'Connor, J.)
(reasoning in part from the fact that federal statutory declaratory judgments are
discretionary). Wilton is a clearer example of the phenomenon of federal abstention
from state-law cases than Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976) (holding that federal courts should stay actions in which there are
prior actions pending in the state courts, state adjudication is part of a complex
regulatory scheme, and to go forward would result in piecemeal litigation). In Colorado River, the United States was a party, and important issues of federal law
were involved.
40. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). It is pointed out by my august colleague, CHARLES
ALAN W R I G ~THE
,
LAW OF FEDERALCOURTS 114 (5th ed. 19941, that the Supple-
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important 1984 case, the Supreme Court placed certain statelaw claims within the truly exclusive jurisdiction of state
courts. The Court found constitutional authority in the Eleventh Amendment to hold that state-law claims for injunctive
relief against local officials may not be heard by federal courts
in their pendent jurisdiction over federal civil-rights claims.
Pennhurst blocks federal court orders restraining state officials
from violating state law. Pennhurst thus devolves upon the
states an exclusive jurisdiction over all injunction suits against
local authorities when pleaded as a matter of state law.
In the Westfall Act of 1988;' amending the Federal Tort
Claims
Congress clarifies that the states have exclusive
jurisdiction over tort cases under state law against federal
employees, making such cases nonremovable when the Attorney General finds that the defendant employee was not acting
within the scope of federal employment when the tort occurred." To be sure, the 1995 case of Gutierrez de Martinez v.

mental Jurisdiction Statute of 1990 cannot cure Pennhurst because Pennhurst was
decided under the Eleventh Amendment, not simply a s a matter of the scope of
federal equity or of a federal court's pendent jurisdiction. To this it might be added that Congress could override Pennhurst under its powers to "abrogate" the Eleventh Amendment. Cf: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (under 5 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (under
the Commerce Clause). Congress need only use clear language extending federal
pendent or diversity jurisdiction to state-law equitable claims against state officials.
Id. a t 14-15 (Brennan, J.) ("[Tlhe power to regulate commerce includes the power
to override States' immunity from suit, but we will not conclude that Congress has
overridden this immunity unless it does so clearly."). But see id. a t 36 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part) ("Better to overrule Hans [v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against states even in nondiversity
cases arising under federal law)], I should think . . . . We do not need Hans for
the 'clear statement' rule . . . ."). For pre-Union Gas writing on the issue, interestingly considering, among other things, a theory of protective jurisdiction, see
George D. Brown, Beyond PennhursGProtective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the
Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343 (1985).
41. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(commonly known as the Westfall Act), Pub. L. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563-67.
42. 28 U.S.C. 88 1346(b), 2674, 2679(d) (1988). This replaced the Government
[or Federal] Drivers' Act of 1961, 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(b).
43. 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(l). Such a case will be dismissed from federal court
in the absence of diversity of citizenship between the parties. When such a case is
first filed in state court it becomes unremovable. In contrast, when the Attorney
General certifies that a defendant employee was acting within the scope of her
federal employment a t the time of the alleged tort, the United States is substituted as party defendant; the federal courts then have exclusive jurisdiction; and any
cases pending in the state courts are removed without possibility of remand. The
Attorney General's certification is conclusive for purposes of removal.
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L ~ m a g n omay
~ ~ have modified this exclusivity somewhat, but
leaves it untouched in the general run of cases under the Act.
In Lamagno, the Court held, 5:4, that the Attorney
General's determination that the federal employee did or did
not act within the scope of her employment is judicially reviewable. This result creates the intriguing possibility that the
federal courts might have to adjudicate a nondiversity case
arising under state law. This can be seen by supposing that the
Attorney General issues a within-the-scope certification and
removes the case. Then, since the correctness of the certification is now judicially reviewable under Lamagno, the district
court reviews it, and holds that the certification was erroneous.
There is no possibility of remand, because under the Westfall
Act the Attorney General's certification is explicitly made conclusive for purposes of removal.45Thus, a case Congress intended, and Article I11 seems to require, to be heard exclusively
in state court may wind up in federal court. I will return once
or twice to this interesting hypothetical case.46

B. National Power over Concurrent State Jurisdiction in
State-Law Cases
When Congress grants federal courts jurisdiction over
state-law cases, there is an obvious implicit presumption of
concurrent state jurisdiction. The important example, of course,
is the current codification of the grant of diversity jurisdict i ~ n . This
~ ? presumption of concurrent state jurisdiction over
state-law claims is somewhat analogous to the more surprising
implicit presumption of concurrent state jurisdiction that is
made when Congress grants federal courts jurisdiction over
cases likely to be adjudicated under federal law.48

44. 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1988).
46. See infra notes 65-69, 210-13, 233-34 and accompanying text.
47. 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (1988). The statute today omits the explicit reference to
the concurrent jurisdiction of the states seen in 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
On the presumptive concurrent state jurisdiction over state claims triable in federal
bankruptcy proceedings, see Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 133 (1876).
48. The federal common-law rule is that unless Congress explicitly grants
exclusive federal jurisdiction, there is concurrent state jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tafflin
v. Levitt, 493 US. 455 (1990) (holding civil RICO claims within the presumed
concurrent jurisdiction of the states); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
473, 477-78 (1981) (claims arising on the outer continental shelf); Charles Dowd
Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (same; claims under Q 301 of the National Labor Relations Act); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 133 (1876) (claims in
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Notwithstanding this presumption, we do see explicit
conferrals of concurrent jurisdiction over nonfederal claims, or
a t least allowances for concurrent jurisdiction. The best-known
which
example must be section 11 of the First Judiciary Act:'
expressly granted diversity jurisdiction to the federal circuit
courts, "concurrent with the courts of the several States . . . ."
State jurisdiction in such cases preexisted the federal statute,
and the states would have continued to adjudicate their diversity cases in the absence of the statute.
Today the phenomenon of explicit recognition of state concurrent jurisdiction over nonfederal claims can be seen, for
example, in the statutory charter of the Red cross." That legislation gives the Red Cross the power "to sue and be sued in
courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United state^."^' This head of concurrent jurisdiction has assumed recent importance in the wake of the outbreak of AIDS cases contracted fi-om transfusions of contaminated blood from Red Cross supplies.52
Another example is seen in the Foreign Sovereign Immuni~ Act provides that its standards of forties Act of 1 9 7 6 . ~The
eign sovereign immunity54apply in both sets of courts;55does
, ~ ~ pronot make its grant of federal jurisdiction e x c l ~ s i v e and

bankruptcy [for the effect of the automatic federal stay of state proceedings under
11 U.S.C. 5 362, see, e.g., In re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 119, 444 A.2d 1107, 1115
(1982) (construing the automatic stay as not enjoining a pending state action)]);
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 16 (1820) (court-martials of draft evaders).
The important exception is the implied exclusive federal jurisdiction in antitrust.
General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922); see, e.g.,
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U S . 373, 379-83
(1985); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U S . 623, 664 (1977); Freeman v. Bee
Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943).
49. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
50. Act of Jan. 5, 1905, ch. 23, 5 2, 33 Stat. 600, 36 U.S.C. $8 1-17 (1988).
51. 36 U.S.C. 5 2 (1988).
52. For discussion of American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 US. 247
(1992), a n Article I11 case that arose in this context, see infra notes 218-36 and accompanying text.
53. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. $8 1330, 1441(d),
1602-11 (1988); see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489
(1983) (Burger, C.J.) ("The Act expressly provides that its standards control in 'the
courts of the United States and of the States,' 5 1604, and thus clearly contemplates that such suits may be brought in either federal or state courts.").
54. 28 U.S.C. 5 1605 (providing generally that there is no immunity for acts
arising out of nongovernmental conduct occurring in this country or with direct
effects in this country).
55. 28 U.S.C. 5 1604.
56. 28 U.S.C. 5 1330 (granting nonexclusive jurisdiction).
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vides explicitly for discretionary removal of claims pleadable
under the
The Act is construed as intending that cases
under it do not arise under federal law. Rather, the liability of
a foreign sovereign is to be determined under the law that
would be applicable if the defendant were a private individual,58 and such law generally would be "the law of the place
where the act or omission
The upshot is that liability under the Act typically is governed by the law of a state,
or of a foreign nation?'
It might be tempting to think of the jurisdiction Congress
confers upon the states under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as surplusage. The states have always adjudicated
claims under state and foreign law. One might want to think of
the Act simply as clearing away the inhibition of a preexisting
defense, the defense of sovereign immunity, in cases challenging only the nongovernmental conduct of a foreign sovereign.
The Supreme Court similarly cleared away a preexisting defense to state adjudication when it extended the Federal Arbitration Act to the states.61For my purposes it does not matter
how you think of the effect of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act upon state courts. But the Act looks increasingly like a
conferral of jurisdiction upon the states as one recognizes how
much else Congress does in the Act to open state courts to new
business. For example, Congress endows the state courts with
powers of worldwide service of process in cases under the
57. 28 U.S.C. $ 1441(d).
58. 28 U.S.C. 5 1606 provides:
[Tlhe foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same
extent a s a private individual under like circumstances; but . . . except for
an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages . . . . [Ilf, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law
of the place where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been
construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign
state shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages . . . .
Id. (emphases added).
59. Id.
60. C f . First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (explaining that, although federal
common law must govern threshold statutory issues under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, like the amenability of a particular governmental instrumentality
to suit, the substantive liability of a statutory defendant is not to be determined
under federal law).
61. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 US. 1 (1984) (under the Federal Arbitration Act, the state courts may not refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate if
the agreement is in interstate commerce).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1608.
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There are statutes that may fall into this category of explicit provision for concurrent state jurisdiction, but that I am
hesitant to include in it. I refer to statutes in which Congress
does not seem so much to be permitting or recognizing state
law to govern of its own force as it seems to be incorporating
state law as federal law. Thus, I have not mentioned the interesting example of the Price-Anderson Amendments of 1 9 8 8 , ~ ~
creating a new federal cause of action for damages for nuclear
accident, with original jurisdiction in both sets of courts, and
mandating that the liability laws in such cases derive from the
law of the place of the accident. Of course along the spectrum
of such statutes there may well be some that could be viewed
in either light.64
Gutierrez de Martinez v. L a r n a g n ~furnishes
~~
an example
of the metaphysical distinction I am trying to describe, although in the end it has to do with exclusive federal jurisdiction, and slips outside the category of concurrent cases that I
have been considering. In Lamagno, eight of the Justices of the
current Court seem prepared to assume that claims in federal
court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended by the
Westfall
are governed by state law operating of its own
force?? This assumption makes sense to me only because the
Justices in Lamagno were making it in the context of a hypothetical problem not addressed in the statutory scheme: federal
adjudication of the liability, under state law, of a federal employee in an erroneously removed case?

63. Price-Anderson Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. $5 2014, 2273, 2282a
(1988). The Price-Anderson Act, as amended, creates a new "public liability action"
for nuclear accidents, and contemplates original jurisdiction over the action in both
federal and state courts, subject to removal and transfer to a federal court a t the
place of accident. The complaint states this new cause of action only if it fulfills
statutory criteria. See In re T.M.I. Litig. Cases Consol. 11, 940 F.2d 832 (3rd Cir.
1991) (suggesting that Article I11 jurisdiction in an action under the Act could be
sustained based on these federal statutory elements). The Act stipulates that the
law governing liability under the new cause of action shall be derived from the law
of the state in which the nuclear accident occurs. 42 U.S.C. 5 2014(hh) (1988).
64. See, e.g., Trade Readjustment Act of 1974, supra note 25.
65. 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995).
66. 28 U.S.C. $ 1346(b) (1988), as amended by the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C.
$$ 2672, 2674 (Supp. 1993); see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
67. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. a t 2236-37 (Ginsburg, J., for four of the Justices); id.
a t 2239 (Souter, J., dissenting for four of the Justices but making the same assumption that liabilities under the Act are governed by state law of its own force).
68. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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Now, once a defendant employee in a state-court case under the Act is certified as having acted within the scope of her
employment, the case is removed to federal court without possibility of remand. By holding the Attorney General's certification judicially reviewable, Lamagno raises a curious question.
What happens, if in reviewing the certification, the federal
court holds that the Attorney General erred? The federal court
will still have exclusive jurisdiction, but the case will be an
ordinary tort case. Assuming the constitutionality of such jurisdiction,69it is here that state law surely governs of its own
force.
On the other hand, in the general run of federal tort claims
under the Westfall Act, the liability of the United States as
substituted defendant is governed, in my view, by federal law,
even though federal law incorporates state law by reference."
It is true that there is language in the statute,?' similar to
language we have seen in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act," providing that in ordinary tort cases arising out of the
activities of federal employees the United States shall be liable
"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . ." And it is'true that I have
assumed here that state law governs of its own force in cases
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. But the liability
of the United States is a federal concern in a direct "comesfrom-Uncle-Sam7s-treasury"way that the liability of a foreign
sovereign is not. In actions under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the nation has little or no interest in the merits. The
chief national interest affecting the merits in such suits is the
foreign-relations interest of assuring foreign governments that
in this country they are immune from liabilities for actions
taken within their governmental sphere.73 The Westfall Act
cases seem quite different to me. Indeed, as we have seen, in
such cases concurrent state jurisdiction is extinguished when
the Attorney General makes the triggering determination.

69. See infra notes 210-13, 233-34 and accompanying text.
70. 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(b).
71. 28 U.S.C. 8 2074.
72. See supra notes 53-62, infra note 196 and accompanying text.
73. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (referring to the legislative history to support the
view that Congress does not intend a federal common law in cases under the Act).
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C. National Ouster of State Jurisdiction in State-Law Cases
Ouster of state concurrent jurisdiction over state questions
is not unknown. There is the explicit grant to federal courts of
jurisdiction over removed diversity cases from state courts,74
subject only to a federal court's discretion to remand, and statelaw governance is likely in such cases. An interesting body of
federal common law also permits removal of even a
nondiversity state-law case to federal courts when it can be
argued that the claim is "really federal."75An even more exotic form of ouster of state jurisdiction over state-law questions
occurs in those rare cases in which federal courts will grant an
injunction under federal law to restrain state proceedings to
enforce state law.76
The Supreme Court can hold state adjudicatory as well as
legislative jurisdiction over certain state-law cases to be preempted. But in such cases we find, oddly, that federal jurisdiction also is likely to be a casualty. We generally suppose that

74. 28 U.S.C.
1441(a) (1988).
75. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U S . 394, 397 n.2 (1981)
(approving the removal of a state-law case as an "artfully pIeaded," "essentially
federal law" case sounding in antitrust).
76. The classic case is Ex parte Young, 209 US. 123 (1908). Today the availability of this sort of "oustern depends upon exceptions to the general rule of Younger v. Harris, 401 US. 37 (1971), which forbids such injunctions. In theory, a
federal court can enjoin state enforcement proceedings not yet "pending," i.e., before
they are under way-assuming the federal plaintiff has standing. See Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 US. 452, 475-76 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining that
standing rarely will be found). For an important example, see O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 US. 488 (1974) (holding that the named plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
criminal procedures when it was speculative that the plaintiffs would commit
crimes and that they would then be arrested). Even if state proceedings are not
yet pending when the federal injunction suit is filed, and even if the federal plaintiff has standing, the federal suit can be dismissed under Younger a t any time
before "proceedings of substance on the meritsn have taken place in the federal
court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975). See generally ERWIN
715-56 (2d ed. 1994); LOUISE WEINBERG,
CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERALJURISDICTION
FEDERAL COURTS:CASESAND COMMENTS
ON FEDERALISM
AND JUDICIAL
POWER 70047 (1994). There is an exception to these restrictive rules for harassing state prosecutions brought repetitively in bad faith. An example is the federal injunction that
ended Jim Garrison's repetitive prosecutions of Clay Shaw in New Orleans for
allegedly conspiring in the assassination of President Kennedy and for perjury. (For
background see the controversial fictionalizing Oliver Stone movie, JFK, in which,
among other curious twists of reality, Garrison, the real-life prosecutor, plays Chief
Justice Earl Warren). See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 US. 584, 586 (1978) (noting
the District Court's issuance of the injunction); Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113
(5th Cir. 1972) (same case, approving the lower court's issuance of the injunction);
Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (D. La. 1971) (same case, issuing the injunction).
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the natural congruence between the jurisdiction of state and
federal courts is a function of the national interest in the merits; but in these cases the jurisdiction of courts typically is
ousted to protect the original jurisdiction of some alternative
forum for dispute r e s ~ l u t i o n ,or~ ~to protect the original jurisdiction of an administrative agency.78
There is a similar class of cases in which the jurisdiction of
courts is ousted to protect the prerogatives of a political branch
of the g o ~ e r n m e n t but
; ~ ~ here, curiously, we find that occasionally one of these so-called "political questions," although
not justiciable in federal courts, remains justiciable in state
courts. Some state courts, for example, will adjudicate cases
under the Guarantee Clause in which a political minority attempts a court challenge to the legitimacy of state g~vernment.'~

77. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding under the
Federal Arbitration Act that arbitration agreements must be enforced in state as
well as federal courts for all agreements in interstate commerce, notwithstanding
that the Act seems to have been intended for federal courts only). But see AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 845 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
1''( shall not in the future dissent from judgments that rest on Southland. I will,
however, stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling it.").
78. E.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
(holding that courts may not adjudicate activities arguably protected or prohibited
by the National Labor Relations Act).
79. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (holding
under the federal common law governing the foreign relations of the United States
that the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign is not adjudicable in any court in
this country, because confided to the political branches). For recent writing on
Sabbatino, see Jack Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil
Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & POLV INT'L
BUS. 461 (1993). As this reference suggests, the issue in Sabbatino may be viewed
more broadly as among those legal issues which are held to present "political questions" because confided to a political branch. E.g., Nixon v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 732 (1993) (holding that courts may not review the legitimacy of impeachment
proceedings against a federal judge, where trial was by a Senate committee).
On the political-question problem in the context of the electoral process, see
Symposium, "Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government," 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 709-946 (1994), including articles by Ann Althouse, Kathryn Abrarns, Akhil
Amar, Erwin Chemerinsky, Jesse Choper, Richard Collins, Julian Eule, Hans
Linde, Deborah Merritt, Robert Nagel, Louise Weinberg, and G. Edward White. See
generally PHILIPPA P. STRUM,THE SUPREMECOURTAND "POLITICAL
QUESTIONS:"A
STUDYIN JUDICIAL
EVASION (1974); Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643
(1989); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 97 (1988).
80. U.S. CONST.art. IV, 8 4 (guaranteeing to every state a republican form of
government). For state adjudications under the Guarantee Clause notwithstanding
the political-question doctrine, see In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question
No. 640, 820 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1992); Cagle v. Qualified Electors, 470 So.2d 1208
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The exclusive state jurisdiction in these "political question"
cases perplexes me. The Guarantee Clause is held to be
nonjusticiable because the question of the legitimacy of a state
government is thought to be a question confided to C o n g r e ~ s . ~ ~
Although in my view access to courts for the political minority
is generally a good thing, I fail to see how, once a question is
held confided to Congress, the state courts can suppose they
retain jurisdiction over it .82One suspects that the state courts
take these cases not because current Supreme Court jurisprudence allows it, but rather because current Supreme Court
jurisprudence is wrong.
Another variety of ouster of state jurisdiction might be
supposed to attend federal preemption of state law. But federalization of a state-law question will not necessarily oust state
courts of concurrent jurisdiction over the sorts of disputes federalized. Federalization does mean that federal courts will gain
a t least concurrent jurisdiction over the federalized claims. And
the state will have to adjudicate the federalized questions as a
matter of federal, not state law and policy. This is also true
when a whole field of law is held "preempted" by federal law, or
when state law in actual conflict with federal law must fall,
under the Supremacy Clause. The state courts are not necessarily closed against such issues, but the articulate voice of the
state sovereign is stilled in its own courts.

D. National Regulation of State-Court Adjudication of
State-Law Cases
The nation pervasively regulates the administration even
of state law in state courts. The national interest in fair procedures in state courts, manifest in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, justifies federal constraints upon state
assertions of jurisdiction over the person83and upon state pre-

(Ma. 1985); Opinion of the Justices, 468 So.2d 883 (Ala. 1985).
81. The classic case is Luther v. Borden, 48 US. (7 How.) 1 (1849); see also
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding justiciable, under the Equal Protection
Clause, the malapportionment of a state legislature; distinguishing but not overruling Luther v. Borden).
82. For the argument that Guarantee Clause claims are adjudicable in state
courts, see Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994); contra Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the
Guamntee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.887, 941-45 (1994).
83. The Supreme Court exercised this power soon after the 1868 ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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judgment attachment^.^^ Moreover, if state law does not provide an anticipatory remedy, the state must provide "meaningful backward-looking relief" for unconstitutional taxes collected,85and the Supreme Court suggests that such relief be provided under state law.86The state must furnish appellate review of punitive damages.87 Also as a matter of due process,
state courts choosing among state laws must choose reasonably;
they are free to apply only non-arbitrary, relevant law. On any
substantive issue the state must apply the law of a state having a significant governmental interest in the issue; to fail to
do so is held to be as much a violation of substantive as of
procedural due process.88
A comprehensive federal code of criminal procedure has
been imposed by the Supreme Court upon the states, through
all phases of the state criminal process, in the interest of effectuating the procedural due process guarantees of the selectively
incorporated Bill of right^.^'

84. E.g.,Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
85. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18
(1990). For discussion of McKesson in relation to National Private Truck Council,
1996
Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995), see LOUISEWEINBERG,
supra note 8, a t 92, 241-42 (1995).
SUPPLEMENT,
86. National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct.
2351 (1995) (holding that a state court need not try a claim against state officials
a s a federal civil-rights claim when federal courts would not).
87. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
88. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (holding that a
state with only insignificant contacts with a multistate case may not apply its own
law to every issue); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (stating
that to govern a n issue by its laws, a state must have a significant contact or
contacts with that issue, generating governmental interests in the state, such that
application of its law will be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair). But see
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (permitting a state with jurisdiction
over multistate class claims with which it had little, if any, significant contact to
apply its statute of limitations to open the door to claims time-barred in all contact states, because the forum traditionally applies its own statute of limitations).
89. Familiar examples include Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth
Amendment standards of custodial interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches). See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the "Unhappy History" Theory of Civil
Rights Litigation, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 737-765 (1991) (arguing that the action for
damages under the federal civil rights statute that emerged in the Warren Court
period was a function of the contemporaneous selective incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; showing that
the nature of such actions is explained by this connection with the criminal process, including the absence of similar actions in equity; distinguishing actions under the Equal Protection Clause).
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Arguably it is even possible to read the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of national power to
confer jurisdiction upon--or at least to grant procedural or
remedial powers to-state courts adjudicating nonfederal cases,
rather than-as we usually read the Clause-as a source of national power to impose constraints upon state adjudication.
In this brief summary we have seen a number of ways in
which Congress or the Supreme Court can control, modify,
regulate, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of state courts over
cases not likely to involve federal claims.

We have seen that, among other things, Congress can and
does allocate jurisdiction to the state courts in matters not
likely to arise under federal law. We have been introduced to
the example of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.g0The
ALI proposes another such allocation for complex litigation, if
' also have
you discount the provision for state c ~ n s e n t . ~We
seen the interesting instance of section 11 of the original Judiciary Act of 1789. Although section 11of the First Judiciary Act
vested new jurisdiction in federal courts, it also purported to
confer their preexisting diversity jurisdiction upon the states.
The Section is fairly read as at least making room for the preexisting jurisdiction of the states.92
These federal allocations of state jurisdiction hold little
difficulty for us. They exhibit no problem analogous to the

90. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988).
91. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
92. In either set of courts, of course, the diversity jurisdiction was one in
which both nonfederal and federal claims might be heard. There was very little
federal statutory law, and what there was tended actually to confer new concurrent
jurisdiction over new federal claims. For example, although federal jurisdiction over
patent claims is exclusive today, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988), a t one time state
courts had concurrent jurisdiction over infringement suits, Act of July 4, 1836, ch.
357, 5 Stat. 117; Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481; Act of Feb. 21, 1793,
ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318, 322; and claims of wrongful procurement of a patent, Act
of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, Q 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
Certain nonstatutory claims even then might have been recognizable as federal.
In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), recall that Chief Justice
Marshall thought that Marbury had a cause of action "under the laws of his country," id. a t 162, and in effect held that although the Supreme Court lacked power
to hear it, Marbury's petition for a mandamus was triable in any court of competent original jurisdiction. Read broadly, Marbury contemplates lawsuits seeking
enforcement of the Constitution in a t least state courts of first instance, there then
being no general federal-question jurisdiction.
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problem presented by cases in which Congress purports to
confer upon federal courts jurisdiction over state-law claims
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. The latter
situation is a hornet's nest. It has become a deeply metaphysical specialty of federal-courts learning. The struggle has been
to reconcile Congress's Article I power with the constraints
upon the jurisdiction of federal courts imposed by Article III.93
I reach this latter, more familiar problem later in this article; I
do so not only for any lessons the federal-courts learning may
hold for the same problem transposed to state courts, but also
for any perspectives my analysis may open up when applied to
the federal courts. But we can see a t once that when Congress
confers jurisdiction upon the state courts there is no Article-I11
problem. The problem simply goes away. The state courts are
not Article411 courts. The question becomes much more simply
a question of the power of Congress under Article I.
Quite a few other issues slip their old knots as well. We
find that it does not matter in any fundamental sense whether
jurisdiction conferred by Congress upon the states is jurisdiction over nonfederal or federal questions. Congress can act only
in the national interest; Congress must vindicate some national

93. For a brief introduction to the arcana, one probably cannot do better than
Justice Frankfurter's talky, under-organized, but illuminating dissent in Textile
Workers' Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The more recent
cases, some of which I shall have occasion to touch upon in a later Part, include
Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); and, although it is not always recognized as presenting the problem, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Marathon Pipe Line was a jurisdictional catastrophe. In Marathon Pipe Line
the Court declared federal bankruptcy jurisdiction unconstitutional under Article I11
to the extent state claims affecting the assets of the bankrupt were adjudicated by
bankruptcy judges. This was done not on the ground that such claims did not
"arise under" federal law within the meaning of Article 111, but on the spurious
argument that if nondiversity state-law claims were triable in federal courts they
must be tried by tenured judges. The actual problem the case presented was buried in a footnote, Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. a t 72 n.26, and pasted over by the
customary citations to Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 653 (1947) and
Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934), neither of which offer supporting
argumentation. See generally Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (1994); John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to Disputes Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1188 (1993); Thomas Galligan, Jr., Article
III and the "Related To" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U . PUGETSOUNDL. REV. 1 (1987); Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of
Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 703 (1982).
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interest when it confers jurisdiction, whatever the source of the
law likely to govern the merits of cases within that jurisdiction.
Now, when Congress acts in the national interest, the
Supremacy Clause should be expected to kick in. Obligations
under the Supremacy Clause should attach. What I am saying
is that the state cannot decline to exercise federally "conferred"
jurisdiction even when, in the particular case, it is jurisdiction
over nonfederal business.
The intuitive supposition might be that supremacy attaches to a federal grant of jurisdiction to the state courts over
federal, but not state, business. In this view there are no federal "grants" of power over state business to a state court. Rather, Congress sometimes simply acknowledges the states' preexisting jurisdiction over their own affairs. It might be argued
that when, for example, in section 11of the First Judiciary Act,
Congress recognized concurrent diversity jurisdiction in the
state courts, Congress merely allowed for a preexisting jurisdiction which the states would have continued to exercise even
absent the act of Congress. In the diversity statute as codified
today:4 concurrent jurisdiction is not even explicit but is left
to implication. The natural conclusion, it might be argued, is
that state courts exercise only state power over their diversity
cases. Congress, in this view, must be read as simply recognizing concurrent state power. And of course we do think of the
states as exercising state, not federal, power over their diversity cases. Thus-the argument would conclude-the states remain free to withdraw from diversity cases, at least those that
arise exclusively under state law. The states remain free to
confide such cases to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts. No Supremacy Clause obligation could stand in the
way. That, I should think, is the intuitive position.
There is a sense in which all the premises of this position
are true. But the conclusion is not quite accurate. Counterintuitively, the Supremacy Clause in an oblique way does prohibit the state courts from abjuring their diversity jurisdiction
over state-law cases. Intriguingly, once Congress grants or even
acknowledges concurrent jurisdiction, explicitly or by implication, the state courts' choices become circumscribed. Whereas
before the First Judiciary Act-to stay with that example-the
state courts might on some colorable pretext have declined to

94. 28 U.S.C. 1332 (1988).
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adjudicate diversity cases, they cannot do so now. At least they
cannot do so absent the sort of nondiscriminatory procedural
bar the Supreme Court recognizes as an exception to the state
courts' duties to adjudicate federal claims within their concurrent jurisdi~tion.~~
This conclusion follows from the premise that the states,
like the nation, must have a rational basis for the exercise of
their powers.96If, for example, a state declined to adjudicate
cases in which it might have to undertake the onerous task of
choosing law, whether or not the parties to the case were from
different states, under current jurisprudence that state would
be free to dismiss diversity cases as well as nondiversity cases
on this ground.g7But there would be no convincing pretext for
dismissing only diversity cases. At best, the state might argue
that the reason it declines to hear cases by or against citizens
of other states is to accommodate the national interest in providing a federal forum for diversity cases. The state argues that
it is exercising a wise comity and deference by carving away its
own jurisdiction in diversity cases, leaving those cases for the
exclusive jurisdiction of the presumably less biased federal
courts.
But the states are not free to make that accommodation.
The states are not permitted to discriminate, in giving access to
local benefits, including, presumably, local courts, between
those with federal statutory rights and those without, however
deferential the motive.98Thus, the states are as powerless to
95. See infra notes 97, 100, 102 and accompanying text.
96. See infra part IV, notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
97. In the analogous context of state duty to adjudicate federal claims, see
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding under the Supremacy Clause that a
state court may not arbitrarily dismiss a federal statutory claim), it is recognized
that a state may dismiss a federal claim on a procedural ground on which it
would also dismiss an analogous state claim. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929). But the state may not discriminate against those relying on federal law. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990).
98. For this sort of reasoning, see Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068
(1994) (holding unanimously in a labor case that a state may not, in the interest
of steering clear of interference with national governance, give the benefit of its
laws only to those without federal rights); see also National Private Truck Council,
Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351, 2355 (1995) (Thomas, J.) (explaining that a state is not free to decline jurisdiction on grounds of comity when federal courts also would decline). In the analogous context of state jurisdiction over
federal questions, the Court holds that a state may not discriminate, in affording
access to its courts, against those whose cases arise under federal, rather than
state, law. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990). But cf: Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991) (Kennedy, J.) (holding that because
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decline to exercise jurisdiction conferred by Congress in statelaw cases as they are in federal-law cases," even though the
latter may seem to come more directly under the command of
the Supremacy Clause.
It also does not matter, for practical purposes, whether
federally granted state jurisdiction over state-law diversity
questions is actually in some sense "conferred" or whether
Congress simply invokes the residualloo or inherent1'' pow-

many states had excluded railroad workers from their workers' compensation laws
"because of the assumption that FELA provides adequate protection for those workers," a n injured railway worker may sue a state in state court under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, notwithstanding the rule of Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987), that federal courts could not entertain
such suits under the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of clear statutory authorization).
99. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 371; Testa, 330 US. 386.
100. State power over even federal questions is widely viewed as independent
of and "residual" to federal power. This belief has roots in history. The so-called
Madisonian Compromise, by which Article I11 created no federal courts of general
original jurisdiction, but gave Congress the option of doing so, suggests that a
plenary original jurisdiction over federal questions resides in state courts. For recent discussion, see Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and
the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39 (1995). The Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction, which was established in Article 111, implies that in the absence of federal courts of first instance state courts can and must exercise original
jurisdiction over federal questions, subject to Supreme Court review. Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339-40 (1816). Thus, in the silence of
Congress, the states have presumptive concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims.
E-g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460-66 (1990) (civil RICO claims); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U S . 473, 477-78 (1981) (claims arising on the
outer continental shelf); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U S . 502 (1962)
(claims under 8 301 of the National Labor Relations Act); Houston v. Moore, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 16 (1820) (court-martials of draft evaders). For an interesting
recent discussion of early concurrent jurisdiction over federal criminal cases, see
Donald H. Zeigler, Twins Separated a t Birth: A Comparative History of the Civil
and Criminal Arising Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and Some Proposals
for Change, 10 VT. L. REV. 673 (1995). Indeed, under the Supremacy Clause, the
state courts have no choice; they must adjudicate federal claims, Testa, 330 U.S.
386, a t least if they would adjudicate analogous state claims, F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U S . 742, 760 (1982), and must, of course, apply federal law on the substantive issues, Testa, 330 US. a t 392, including issues of their own sovereign
immunity. Howlett, 496 US. 356.
But it remains a common view that the states perform these duties under their
own powers. See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 268
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a federal statute granting the Red
Cross power to sue cannot be read as a grant of jurisdiction or it would become a
grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the states, and thus "cannot reasonably be read
as allowing the Red Cross to enter a state court without establishing the independent basis of jurisdiction appropriate under state law"). This view is seen in the
doctrine that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them; the states are
obliged to enforce federal law only insofar as their jurisdiction permits. Thus, a
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ers of the state courts, or invokes the general jurisdiction the
state legislature happens to have provided.lo2My own thinking is that in such cases state courts sit as courts of the nation,
notwithstanding that they continue to administer state
law,lo3but it should be unimportant whether one thinks they
state that would dismiss an analogous state-law claim on procedural grounds may
similarly dismiss a federal claim; the state is said to have "an otherwise valid
excuse." Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U S . 377, 387-88 (1929)
(Holmes, J.).
This "otherwise valid excuse" doctrine is problematic. Federal supremacy on the
merits implies federal supremacy over state jurisdictional and procedural law that
can affect outcomes on the merits. E.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U S . 229, 238 (1969) (Douglas, J.) ("[The] federal [equitable] remedy for the protection of a federal right is available in the state court, if that court is empowered to
grant injunctive relief generally . . . "); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R.
Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (holding that a state must afford trial by jury in a case
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act).
101. For the view that state jurisdiction over federal questions is "inherent,"
see TaMin v. Levitt, 493 U S . 455, 458 (1990) (O'Connor. J.) ("[We] have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.").
102. For this position in federal-question cases, see American Nat'l Red Cross
v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 268 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This parallel
treatment of state and federal courts even further undermines a jurisdictional reading of the statute, since the provision cannot reasonably be read as allowing the
Red Cross to enter a state court without establishing the independent basis of
jurisdiction appropriate under state law."); see also Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178,
188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe jurisdiction conferred upon [the
state courts] by the only authority that has power to create them and to confer
jurisdiction upon them-namely
the law-making power of the [states]--enables
them to enforce rights no matter what the legislative source of the right may be.");
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U S . 377 (1929) (Holmes, J.):
As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act, that
statute does not purport to require State Courts to entertain suits arising
under it, but only to empower them to do so, so far as the authority of
the United States is concerned . . . . [Tlhere is nothing in the Act . . .
that purports to force a duty upon [state] [clourts as against an otherwise
valid excuse.
Id. a t 387-88 (citation omitted).
103. In the federal-question case of Howlett v. Rose, 496 U S . 356, 366 (1990),
the Court took the position that the Supremacy Clause requires the two sets of
courts to "form one system of jurisprudence" (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U S .
130, 137 (1876)). See also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U S . 455 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring):
State courts have jurisdiction over federal causes of action not because
it is "conferred" upon them by the Congress; nor even because their inherent powers permit them to entertain transitory causes of action arising
under the laws of foreign sovereigns, . . . but because "the laws of the
United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding
on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are . . . . The two
together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of
the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not
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do or not.
What counts is that only national, not state, policy can
ground the power of Congress to devolve concurrent jurisdiction
upon state courts, even when the jurisdiction so devolved or
even merely acknowledged is over claims unlikely to be federal
claims. The obligations of federal supremacy must attach to
national policy in such cases as in others. State courts come
under Supremacy Clause obligations not only when they adjudicate federal questions, but when they adjudicate those nonfederal questions which it is national policy that they adjudicate. It cannot matter to this reasoning whether the state
court, in some mystical sense, becomes a federal court, or
whether the parties believe they invoke state jurisdiction independent of that devolved upon the states by the act of Congress
under which they litigate in the state courts.
In fact, for reasons structural and practical, duties devolved by Congress upon the states to hear nonfederal claims
may be stronger than the same duties devolved upon federal
courts. Even apart from the constraints of Article III,lo4federal courts are under prudential constraints of federalism when
they deal with nonfederal questions.lo5 These additional constraints, like Article 111, are irrelevant in state courts adjudicating nonfederal questions. Indeed, the prudential constraints
on federal adjudication comprise a compelling reason why the
states should and perhaps must furnish a forum. In federal-law
cases, when Congress imposes constraints on federal jurisdiction,lo6 or refuses to grant federal jurisdiction,lo7 the ordi-

foreign to each other . . . ."
Id. a t 469-70 (quoting Claflin, 93 U.S. a t 136-37). This position is different from
and better than the position Justice Scalia was to sign his name to in his dissent
in American Nat'l Red Cross, 505 U S . a t 268.
104. See infra notes 159-236 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-04 (1992) (acknowledging that federal diversity courts do not issue decrees in divorce or child custody
cases); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding
that federal courts have no pendent jurisdiction over equitable civil-rights claims
arising under state law).
106. See, e.g., Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. $ 1341 (1988); National
Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995).
107. The great example, of course, is the failure of Congress to vest original
general federal-question jurisdiction in federal trial courts until 1875. Act of March
3, 1875, ch. 137, $ 1, 18 Stat. 470; see also the 1802 repeal of the abortive 1801
statute attempting to make the jurisdictional grant. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4,
11, 2 Stat. 89, 92; repealed, Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. The grant
of general federal-question jurisdiction is codified today at 28 U.S.C. $ 1331 (1988).
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nary expectation is that the state courts must furnish the needed forum.1o8This is not only suggested by the elementary
concerns of due process, but by federal supremacy. At the end
of the 1994-1995 Term, in his opinion for the Court in National
Private Truck Council, Inc. u. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
Justice Thomas remarked,

. . . Nor can a desire for "intrastate uniformity" permit state
courts to refuse to award relief merely because a federal court
could not grant such relief. [Ilt was not until 1875 that Congress provided any kind of general federal-question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts . . . . Because of the Supremacy Clause, state courts could not have refused to hear cases
arising under federal law merely to ensure "uniformity" between state and federal courts located within a particular
state.log
That state courts must furnish a forum should also be the
ordinary expectation when federal courts labor under analogous
constraints in adjudicating nonfederal questions. The state
forum would be especially necessary to the nation in a hypothetical situation in which the Supreme Court erroneously"0
strikes down, as applied, an act of Congress under Article 111,
on the thinking that Congress cannot constitutionally confer
jurisdiction over nonfederal questions upon federal courts in
the absence of diversity of citizenship of the parties. State
courts in such cases would be the only courts that could effectuate the intentions of Congress, just as they were in most feder-

108. Cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339-40 (1816)
(Story, J.) (arguing that the absence of original federal jurisdiction over general
federal questions, together with the existence of the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over federal questions, implies that the states are bound to try
federal questions subject to Supreme Court review). But see National Private Truck
Council, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (holding that where state law furnishes a remedy, the
state need not adjudicate the grievance under federal civil-rights law, if a federal
court would not).
109. National Private Truck, 115 S. Ct. a t 2355 (citation omitted).
110. I say "erroneously" because I believe that a sufficient federal ingredient
may be supplied by national jurisdictional policy. When the states have concurrent
jurisdiction it is because it is in the national interest for them to have it, whether
or not Congress has chosen to federalize the substantive law that is applied in cases within the jurisdiction. In the national interest Congress has power to vest state
jurisdiction even when Congress does not have power to federalize the substantive
law applicable to the dispute between the parties, as it does, for example, using its
foreign relations power, in those cases against foreign sovereigns that are governed
by foreign law. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. $8 1330,
1441(d), 1602-11 (1988).
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al-question cases before Congress enacted the federal-question
jurisdictional statute in 1875.''' Were the ALI Proposal to be
enacted as law, the state forum could become especially important. There is a strong possibility-since mass torts are likely
to arise under nonfederal law-that the Supreme Court would
hold such an enactment unconstitutional as applied in federal
courts. l2
The Supreme Court has the power of summary vacatur or
reversal if a state court violates the Supremacy Clause by dismissing a federal claim or refusing to decide a federal question
properly presented to it. Vacatur or reversal is equally appropriate when a state court has violated the Supremacy Clause
by dismissing a nonfederal claim over which Congress has
conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the states. And when
Congress confers concurrent jurisdiction expressly or impliedly-whether over claims arising under federal or nonfederal
law-it should come to be understood that state procedural law
as well as state substantive law or policy may not be permitted
to frustrate the national policy underlying the conferral.l13
I have been taking the position that when Congress grants
jurisdiction to the state courts over state-law claims, it is federal power that the states exercise, the nation being the formal
source of their jurisdiction. Interesting theoretical consequences
flow from this hypothesis, some of which have been foreshadowed in the previous discussion. For one thing, if it is in the
national interest that the nation confer jurisdiction upon the
states in a class of cases, it becomes obvious that in the same
national interest the nation can also bestow remedial and procedural powers upon the states, whether or not the class of
cases is likely to be adjudicated on the merits under federal
111. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 5 1, 18 Stat. 470.
112. See infra notes 159-78 and accompanying text. But it should be noted
that in the context of (potential) mass torts, the Court sustained the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction in nondiversity litigation over AIDS-contaminated blood
transfusions, in actions against the Red Cross, a federally chartered organization.
American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992).
113. The phenomenon is seen more familiarly in federal-question cases, in
which from time to time the Supreme Court has forced federal procedures or remedies upon state courts. E.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U S . 229,
238 (1969) (Douglas, J.) ("[The] federal [equitable] remedy for the protection of a
federal right is available in the state court, if that court is empowered to grant
injunctive relief generally . . . ."); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co.,
342 US. 359 (1952) (holding that a state must afford trial by jury in a case under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, even on evidence the state would otherwise
keep from the jury).
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law.l14 Thus, whether the claim be a federal or nonfederal
one, if 'Congress has authorized nationwide service of process
over that claim, the state court has the power of nationwide
service of process. So in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Congress bestows upon both sets of courts worldwide service of
pro~ess."~
Furthermore, if the state courts in these cases exercise federal power, the due process limits on the state's personal jurisdiction are not located in the Fourteenth Amendment, as might have been supposed, but in the Fifth
114. Cf. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760 (1982) (holding that Congress has Commerce power to implement federal law in state tribunals, including
the power to establish procedural minima; referring to claims "analogous" to federal
claims).
115. 28 U.S.C. 9 1608 (1988). Section 1608(a) in terms provides for "Service in
the courts of the United States and of the States . . . ." Compare the provision for
nationwide service in federal courts in the Price-Anderson Act:
With respect to any public liability action arising out of or resulting
from a nuclear incident, the United States district court in the district
where the nuclear incident takes place, or in the case of a nuclear incident taking place outside the United States, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, shall have original jurisdiction without
regard to the citizenship of any party or the amount in controversy. Upon
motion of the defendant, . . . any such action pending in any State court
. . . or United States district court shall be removed or transferred to the
United States district court having venue under this subsection. Process
of such district court shall be effective throughout the United
States . . . .
42 U.S.C. 5 2210(n)(2) (1988). The Price-Anderson Act provides for nationwide service in the federal transferee court, but does not do so in the state courts or in
other federal courts. The exclusion of these courts for this purpose, coupled with
the acknowledgment of their jurisdiction, suggests that this omission is simply part
of the provision for venue of all litigation at the place of accident.
116. So the Supreme Court assumed in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,
504 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1992). In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Congress
grants concurrent jurisdiction to federal and state courts, 28 U.S.C. $5 1330, and
provides worldwide service of process for both sets of courts. 28 U.S.C. 5 1608.
Congress further provides that if the nongovernmental commercial activities giving
rise to a case were conducted in this country or had direct effects in this country,
the foreign sovereign is not immune from liability in the case. 28 U.S.C.
5 1605(a)(2). Furthermore, the foreign sovereign, if without statutory immunity, is
within the personal and subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. 28 U.S.C.
$ 1330(b); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
n.3 (1989). In Weltover, the Supreme Court considered the defendant sovereign's
technical argument that to construe the nexus requirements for statutory jurisdiction less strictly than the "minimum contactsn requirement for personal jurisdiction
would be to raise a problem of Fifth Amendment due process. Assuming, without
deciding, that a foreign state is a "person" for purposes of Fifth Amendment due
process, the Court pointed out that Argentina's nexus with the United States in
that case would be sufficient even under a "minimum contacts" analysis. Weltover,
504 U.S. a t 619-20 (Scalia, J.); see also Lakewood Bank & Trust Co. v. Superior
Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 463, 469-70, 180 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918-19 (1982) (sustaining
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As we have already seen, there is some scope for operation
of the Supremacy Clause in nonfederal cases in state court
under an act of Congress. To be sure, there might well be no
substantive federal law to which federal supremacy could attach, even over a threshold issue.'" But we should be clear
that a state exercising power conferred by the nation, even in a
hypothetical case lacking a single federal-law element, would
be under a duty to vindicate whatever national interest the
nation had in bestowing the power upon the state. The state

the state court's jurisdiction and venue in an action under the Securities Act of
1933 notwithstanding state-law limitations, since the state court had concurrent
jurisdiction and venue under the federal statute); David Carlebach, Note, NationL. REV. 223 (1991) (discussing
wide Service of Process in State Courts, 13 CARDOZO
the effect on state courts of federal conferral of nationwide process).
In more localized state-law cases, even a "congressional grant of nationwide
jurisdiction to the state courts [might] not withstand a Fifth Amendment challenge
on the basis of nothing more than the defendant's presence in, or contacts with,
the United States." Steinman, Reverse Removal, supra note 2, a t 1119. Perhaps in
such cases, in both federal and state courts, the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause eventually will be construed to incorporate Fourteenth Amendment standards. The Supreme Court has avoided this issue thus far in federal-court cases
through statutory interpretation either of the substantive law or the federal venue
statute. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (disapproving jurisdiction over
a remote defendant by a narrow construction of the Mandamus and Venue Act).
But see id. a t 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (assuming the constitutionality of the
statute under a contrary interpretation); Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979) (striking down jurisdiction in an action under the Securities Exchange
Act in which an out-of-state defendant was served with process under the state's
long-arm statute; reaching this result by a narrow construction of the federal venue
statute).
It is not clear how Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), cuts
on these issues. Shutts is quite permissive on the power of the state over nationwide class actions, when members of the class are given an opportunity to opt out.
See Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and
Practical Advantages of the State Fbrum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort
Cases, 21 HASTINGSCONST.L.Q. 215, 259-62 (1994) (discussing the powers of the
unaided state forum in complex litigation).
117. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983)
(Burger, C.J.) (sustaining federal jurisdiction under art. 111; reasoning that cases
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "arise undern the federal substantive
standards of sovereign immunity which must be applied in every case against a
foreign sovereign in either set of courts, the Act being the exclusive vehicle for
suits against a foreign sovereign). On the exclusivity of the remedy provided by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see 28 U.S.C. 5 1604 (providing that "a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and
of the States except a s provided in . . . this chaptern); Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (reaffirming Verlinden, that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is the exclusive judicial remedy for the private
wrongs of foreign sovereigns in both sets of courts).
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courts cannot adjudicate such cases except in deference to that
national interest.
When the nation's policy is unrealized in substantive law,
the national interest might be a jurisdictional interest simpliciter, or it might be a substantive interest in the body of
unfederalized law under which these cases will be litigated.ll8
Either or both of these interests can generate adjudicatory
policies which, I am arguing, become supreme in state courts to
which the nation gives, or in which the nation expects, concurrent jurisdiction. At a minimum, this means that the state
courts must disregard any limitations of state law upon their
powers which would conflict with the federal policy underlying
the jurisdictional and procedural grants of power.llg
This analysis further suggests that, in seeking constraints
upon national power over nonfederal law in state courts, it is to
little purpose to round up the usual suspects. The Tenth
Amendment is especially unhelpful here. It is true that we tend
to think of state power as constraining federal power. We begin
to be schooled in this pattern of thinking as we perceive that
all of our jurisprudence of national constitutional empowerment
emerges against a backdrop of acknowledged state "police"
power.120Even more fundamentally, we are habituated to the
thinking that federal law is created against a broad background of common-law understandings; and when we say "common law" in this context, we tend to refer, shedding our postErie positivism, to the typical law of some state, as modified by

118. This is an "inchoate" interest, as I have elsewhere described the national
interest in law "at the pre-federalized moment." Louise Weinberg, Federal Common
Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 816 (1989); Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion
that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 860, 871 (1989).
119. Also, because of the constitutional pressure for congruence of outcomes in
both sets of courts, the choice-of-law rule that is part of the ALI Proposal on mass
torts, 5 6.01, however impolitic and irrational it may be, see Louise Weinberg,
Mass Torts a t the Neutral Forum, 56 ALB. L. REV. 807 (1993), if allowed to become
operative in federal courts should apply in state courts as well. Id. at 852.
120. The Supreme Court has worked on the "assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617-18 (1992). It is thought to
be a corollary of this presumption that the Constitution withholds "from Congress
a plenary police powern that would enable Congress to enact any legislation without limit. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
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local statute. In admiralty cases to this day lawyers will argue
that some issues should be preserved from federal governance
by saying, interchangeably, that those issues are for "the common law" or "for the states."121 These ingrained understandings find their nearest constitutional expression in the Tenth
Amendment.
But even if one is prepared, with the current Supreme
Court majority, to move toward preserving a larger residuum of
state power from interference by the nation,122the Tenth
Amendment is not necessarily relevant when brought to bear
on the question we are considering. The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, and the ALI Proposal, both bring new jurisdiction to, rather than take existing jurisdiction from, the state
courts .123

121. This feeling that "the common law" is what is outside admiralty is a
vestige of the traditional separation of "law" and "admiralty," cf: Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U S . 354 (1959), and the history in England
of writs of prohibition issuing from the "common-law" courts to block admiralty
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases the "common-law" courts thought
more appropriately triable to juries, under ordinary case and statute law. In this
country, the argument that the nation should not intrude upon the states became
linked in admiralty lawyers' minds with the conventional argument that the admiralty should not intrude upon "the common law." The reality, of course, is that
federal courts sitting "in admiralty," and state courts with concurrent jurisdiction
over maritime cases, 28 U.S.C. $ 1333(1)-like state or federal courts sitting "at
law" or "in equity'-all sit as common-law courts, deciding issues of law as they
arise, in light of precedent and reason; and they apply state cases and statutes on
issues governed by state law, and federal cases and statutes on issues governed by
federal law.
122. The modern history of the Tenth Amendment begins with United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), in which the Supreme Court found the Amendment to be "but a truism." In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (holding that Congress may not regulate the working conditions of state
employees), the Supreme Court tried to breathe life back into the Tenth Amendment; but the Court overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Little was heard from the Tenth Amendment until
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), in which the Court acknowledged
plenary federal power, id. a t 160 (O'Comor, J.) ("Congress could, if it wished, preempt state radioactive waste regulation."), even as i t struck down an act of Congress because Congress asserted its plenary power i n the wrong fashion. Not until
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (deciding, under the Tenth Amendment, that Congress lacks power to regulate guns in schools), has there been a
clear modern holding that Congress lacks Commerce power to regulate, in the
perceived national interest, the market for an item in interstate commerce. While
the Supreme Court has not required Congress to make justifymg "findings," the
Court in Lopez suggested that a specific congressional "finding" of impact upon
interstate commerce might have shifted the result. Id. a t 1631.
123. The reasoning here echoes the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), sustaining the constitutionality of the
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To be sure, in New York v. United States,124the Supreme
Court held under the Tenth Amendment that the nation may
not "commandeery' state processes by requiring the states to
legislate in the national interest.125 But the Supremacy
Clause has always required the states to adjudicate in the national interest,126and therefore, even without the explicit exJones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988), as conferring new jurisdiction upon the admiralty rather than simply transferring cases in admiralty to the federal-question jurisdiction.
124. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Query whether New York, read for whatever bearing
it may have on the question before us, suggests a Tenth Amendment limit on the
power of Congress to vindicate a national interest through liabilities imposed under
unfederalized and unincorporated state law. New York was a challenge to a provision of federal environmental law requiring the states to take title to undisposed-of
hazardous wastes by January 1, 1996, and to become liable for any damages resulting from failure to dispose of these wastes. 42 U.S.C. @ 2021b-2021j (Supp.
1994). But, typically, federal statutory environmental law allows recovery only of
clean-up costs, which are very different from damages for lost profits or for personal injuries or death. But see Price-Anderson Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C.
$8 2104, 2273, 2282a, creating a "public liability action" for nuclear accidents. Nor
can federal common law fill the gap; the Supreme Court has held that federal
environmental statutes preempt federal, but not state, common-law remedies. City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U S . 304 (1981). Thus, New York is an implicit disapproval of national imposition upon the state or its officials of liabilities under state
law.
Interestingly, the Court has placed the federal judiciary under analogous constraints. E.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(holding that principles of federalism bar federal courts from issuing injunctions on
state-law theories in cases against state officials).
New York in this respect is a t odds with Ex parte Siebold, 100 U S . 371 (1879)
(holding that Congress has power to enact a law regulating federal elections which
in so doing provides penalties against state officials for violating state law); Ex
parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879) (same).
125. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S.264, 288 (1981)). Justice O'Connor, writing for
the New York Court, reasoned that to permit the nation to commandeer state
legislative processes would be to muddy the lines of political accountability. New
York, 112 S. Ct. a t 2424. But it is unclear how the Court's reasoning applies to
the case on its own facts. In New York, the federal statute required a state unable
to find a site for its hazardous wastes before 1996 to take title to the wastes and
become liable for all resulting damages. 42 U.S.C. $5 2021b-2021j (Supp. 1994). It
is not clear that this "take title" provision required the state to legislate. Nor
would i t confuse the lines of political responsibility for the nation to act on the
principle-sound,
it seems to me--that in the first instance responsibility for
wastes within their borders is upon the states. Moreover, far from being "commandeered" by the nation, the concerned states themselves had sought Congressional
enforcement of their own interstate agreement for disposal of hazardous wastes.
New York, 112 S. Ct. a t 2435-38 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For current commentary on New York, see generally the symposium on New
York in 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (19941, including articles by Jesse Choper,
Candice Hoke, and Martin Redish.
126. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 US. 742, 760 (1982).

7311

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COURTS

769

ception for adjudication allowed by the Court in New Y ~ r k , ' ~ ~
the "no commandeering" rationale of that case is quite inapplicable to our problem.
As for other limitations, Article I11 is not a limit on the
power of Congress over the state courts. The Fourteenth
Amendment also becomes less relevant for the state's exercise
of federal powers in cases under either the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act or the ALI Proposal. It is Congress, not the
state legislature, that creates the state jurisdiction in the Act
and in the Proposal, and of course the Fourteenth Amendment
is no limit on the power of Congress. We are left, rather, with
the Due Process Clause of the FiRh Amendment, operative in
' ~ ~ procedural aspects.
this context in both its s u b s t a n t i ~ e and
In summary, when Congress in the national interest explicitly or implicitly devolves upon state courts jurisdiction
even over possibly nonfederal cases, the states come under a
duty to vindicate any such national interest in their courts, a
duty imposed by the Supremacy Clause. The same governmental interest that supports the grant to the states of jurisdiction
supports further grants to them of procedural or remedial powers. The constraints of Article I11 or the Tenth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment are not constraints upon either the
nation or the states to the extent that the state courts are
exercising powers conferred by Congress. The relevant constraint in this context, in state as well as federal courts, is the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

127. New York, 505 U.S. a t 178, 179 (07Connor, J.) ("Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but
this sort of federal 'direction' of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause. No comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to
command state legislatures to legislate."). Presumably a similar distinction would
enable Congress to confer jurisdiction upon the states notwithstanding a hypothetical constitutional amendment prohibiting unfunded mandates. But see H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (arguing that New York is inconsistent with Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that state courts must accept Supreme Court review of
their final judgments on federal questions). For the argument that the Supremacy
Clause "commandeers" all state actors, not only the state judiciary, see Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State
Oficers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM.L. REV. 1001, 1038-49 (1995).
128. See infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
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AND THE STATECOURTS
INTEREST
IV. THENATIONAL

Of course, Congress, like the Supreme Court, is hardly
likely to attempt to force state courts to try state-law cases
otherwise beyond their powers. The nation could not, and as a
practical matter would not, seek to accomplish such an end
without some convincing reason. The nation cannot act in the
absence of a clear national interest-a rational basis for the
action it takes. The corollary of that proposition is that when
the national interest-for example in affording due process in
all courts-so requires, Congress or the courts may condition
the manner in which state courts try state-law cases, and may
even force trial of state-law cases upon the state courts.129
National interest is the foundation of national power130
even when the national interest is only inchoate-that is, before national power has been exercised substantively in its
vindication. Thus, it often happens that we must glean what
the national interest is through purposive, teleological reasoning,l3l looking to text, history, analogous legislation, and the
129. See supra parts 11, 111.
130. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U . L. REV. 805, 80914 (1989) (arguing governmental "empowerment" has its source in legitimate governmental interest, as a corollary to the proposition that a government without
significant interests in a matter is without power to regulate that matter).
131. The irrationalities in the lawmaking process that can come between inquiry and understanding do not affect the purposive reasoning upon which the identification of governmental interest depends. The comparative success of purposive
reasoning flows from the fact that it presumes that the rule or statute under examination is based upon intelligible public policy. Actual legislators' choices, however confused, bought, or subversive, are not a feature of purposive reasoning. But
see Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme Court
and Legislative Compromise, 44 EMORYL. J. 117 (1995). The presumption that
intelligible public policy underlies the laws leads to the presumption that law generally should be applied and enforced. Purposive reasoning will reject only those
laws for which no rational support in public policy can be hypothesized. At a more
nuanced level, purposive reasoning rejects for application only those laws which, on
balance, are insufficiently supported by reason, on the particular facts. It is true
that, without taking countervailing interests into account (or by taking only countervailing interests into account, or by taking into account only the interests of
those in power), judges can manipulate purposive reasoning. But so also can they
manipulate intentionalist reasoning by relying on selected legislative history, or by
focusing on expressions of individual legislators' motives. So also can judges manipulate textualist reasoning by subordinating the purposes of legislation to its
"clear" language, or by consulting selected old dictionaries. See generally Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony
and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995). It is
a n old Realist insight that no method of reasoning can save us from the predilections of judges. That is why judges are politically appointed, or elected outright.
But purposive reasoning, which seeks a n understanding of the mischiefs a rule is
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analogous opinions of courts and writers. Moreover, a conclusion about the national interest is likely to be convincing only
after balancing the perceived interest against equally inchoate
countervailing policies.132
The importance of a finding of national interest before an
assertion of national power133in what I have elsewhere called
"the pre-federalized moment,"134 needs to be emphasized. Indeed, it more accurately describes cases not yet decided to say
that it is policy, rather than law, that decides them. What is
"supreme" under Article VI is national policy rather than federal law. It is a federal view of the issues that the Supremacy
Clause will compel. To put this another way, under the Supremacy Clause federal law is supreme where it applies even
when there is no preexisting federal law.135

meant to control, and an evaluation of the rule's current policy supports and limits, is probabIy the method that better invites salient debate among lawyers and
judges.
For general studies in theories of rational choice as they apply to legislation,
see DANIELA. FARBER& PHILIP P. FRICKEY,LAWAND PUBLICCHOICE(1991); Philip P. Frickey, Constitutional Structure, Public Choice, and Public Law, 12 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 163 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 63 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications
of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988). On
irrationality in the legislative process in the context of complex litigation, see
Charles G. Geyh, Complex-Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REV.
LITIG. 401 (1991) (discussing the failure of the well-received proposals for mass
accident contained in H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess ["the Kastenmeier Bill"]).
132. Notwithstanding the usefulness of Justice O'Connor's interest-balancing
opinion in Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (19891, infra part VI.B, I sympathize
with Justice Scalia's conviction that "balancing" is not very doable. See, e.g., Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988):
Having evaluated the interests on both sides as roughly as this, the
Court then proceeds to judge which is more important. This process is
ordinarily called 'balancing,' Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970), but the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests
on both sides are incommensurate. I t is more like judging whether a
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.
Id. a t 897 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGSL.J. 825 (1994); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding
Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 711 (1994).
133. See, eg., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (suggesting
the helpfulness of a legislative "findingn of national interest when Congress purports to assert its Commerce power to ban the possession of guns within 1,000 feet
of a school).
134. Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 118, a t 816.
135. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U S . 205 (1917), in which
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Where Congress has legislated, or the Supreme Court has
fashioned a body of jurisprudence, the subject already has been
federalized. The legitimacy of the federalization remains dependent on the finding of a national interest or interests that justify the exercise of lawmaking power.136 The Supreme Court
has long recognized that the presumptive power of a sovereign
is co-extensive with the sovereign's sphere of interest.13?
Whether the Justices reason under the Commerce Clause,138
the Due Process Clause,139 the Equal Protection Clause,140
the Contract Clause,141 or the Full Faith and Credit
federal law was held to preempt a state statute even though there was no applicable federal rule or statute a t the time. For examples of the fashioning of a federal
common-law rule for a case from identified national policy, see Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp, 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
136. As the powers of Congress have been read more and more expansively,
federalization has become increasingly controversial. See the symposium on federalization a t 44 DEPAULL. REV. 1995, including Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization, 44 DEPAULL. REV. 755, 755 (1995).
137. For Supreme Court discussion of the power of a state, sometimes referred
to a s its "police power," when measured against federal limitations, see Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (sustaining under the Commerce Clause a state ban on
the importation of live baitfish, a s within legitimate state governmental purposes,
relying on Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)); Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (sustaining under the First
Amendment an ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property, a s
within legitimate state governmental purposes, relying on Berrnan and United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229 (1984) (sustaining under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause a
state land-use law as within legitimate state governmental purposes, also relying
on Berman). See Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 118, a t 809-14.
138. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1659 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's holding that Congress lacks Commerce power to
regulate guns in schools in view of the national interest in the safe education of
the workforce); South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938) (explaining that, notwithstanding the Commerce Clause's implied limitation
on state laws affecting interstate commerce, the states retain "police powern over
matters of local policy concern).
139. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (holding under the Due
Process Clause that the state to which a widow executrix has moved after the
death of her husband has power to declare the value of the proceeds of his insurance policy; explaining that this contact, a t least when combined with the defendant insurer's business presence in the state and other such contacts, generated
sufficient governmental interest in the state to ensure that application of its law to
that issue was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair).
140. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (explaining that
generally a state may make classifications for which there is a rational basis in its
legitimate governmental interests).
141. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (explaining
that a state must have power to regulate contracts when its legitimate governmental interests so require, notwithstanding the Contracts Clause).
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Clause,142the requirement remains constant. A sovereign has
presumptive governmental power if it has a governmental
interest. It is the sovereign's governmental interest that the
Court refers to when it finds the "rational basis" that enables a
law to survive minimal constitutional scrutiny.'"
This threshold of power, when it is the power of a state, is
sometimes referred t o as the state's "police power." The "police
power" might be thought a concept that is exclusively described
as a residuum of general power belonging to the states; and, to
be sure, it is widely understood that the Constitution does not
confer on the nation a general "police power."144But to the
extent this understanding is sound, it is only because national
interests and the interests of a particular state are different
things. In the presence of a national interest the nation can
and does act even in matters traditionally governed by the
states. I am arguing at a higher level of generality that the
true source of state power is analytically the same as the true
source of federal power: both powers find their source in legitimate governmental interest. It is true that where Virginia's
interest ends its power ends; but obviously that is no obstacle
to the accomplishment of the interests Virginia does have. In
just the same way, it is true that where the national interest
ends the power of the nation ends; but obviously that is no
obstacle to the accomplishment of the interests the nation does
have.
Whether the sovereign is a state or the nation, in every
case the lineaments of empowerment are the same.145Law

142. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939) (explaining that the state where a worker is injured has a legitimate governmental interest in furnishing a remedy to the worker and holding that that
state may do so; rejecting the argument that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires application of the law of the state where the employment contract was
made, even when that state's law vests exclusive jurisdiction over such cases i n
the contract state's own workers' compensation board).
143. I pass over as beyond the scope of this article so-called "intermediate"
scrutiny, under which the Supreme Court tests for governmental interests that are
stronger than those having merely a basis in reason, and so-called "strict" scrutiny,
under which the Court requires a compelling governmental interest.
144. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
145. See supra notes 137-42. Thus, in Lopez, the Court held that Congress
lacked Commerce power to ban the possession of guns in schools because it found
insufficient national interest in so doing, a t least in the absence of specific "findings" by Congress of the impact of the subject on interstate commerce. If indeed
national interest was insufficient, an application of the statute would also violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If the reader believes that in
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that emanates from a sovereign without a governmental interest will be arbitrary and irrational, and in this country will
violate the most basic principle of substantive due process. We
would no more let stand a Pennsylvania conviction of a Pennsylvania defendant for embezzlement, if the embezzler were
tried under the laws of Alaska because Alaska comes before
Pennsylvania in the alphabet, than we would let stand that
Pennsylvania conviction if obtained on evidence relevant not to
the alleged embezzlement, but to an unrelated burglary because burglary comes before embezzlement in the alphabet.
Law without a basis in reason is no law at all, and law outside
the legitimate governmental concerns of the sovereign from
which it emanates is no law at all. What I am saying is that
those whose claims or defenses are adjudicated in American
courts have a due process right to relevant law. That must be
true whether the issue is one of state law or federal law. We
have to treat the source of presumptive power of the nation, as
well as of a state, as an identified legitimate governmental
interest.
So, for example, the question whether Congress has power
to vest jurisdiction in state courts over multistate mass torts
cannot be answered definitively by searching the Constitution
for some expressly delegated power. Even if there was a mass
tort clause in Article I and even if it mentioned state courts it
would not be conclusive. The answer to the question whether
Congress may vest jurisdiction over mass torts in state courts,
in the particular case, can be answered only with reference to
the national interest on the particular facts. Of course, Congress has no more power than is necessary and proper to provide for our "general welfaren-"We, the people of the United
States."146
Similarly, the existence of textual constitutional constraints upon the exercise of national power cannot give us a
definitive answer in a particular case. Rather, the answer in
each case will be found by consulting the national interest, and
such limiting or countervailing interests as we can glean from
available materials.

Lopez Congress did not exceed its Commerce powers, it is precisely because the

reader does not find a prohibition of guns in schools to be beyond the sphere of
legitimate national governmental interest.
146. US. CONST. preamble.
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This is the true usefulness of authoritative legal texts. It is
a characteristic of the lawyer's analysis that an inquiry into
governmental interest invites inquiry into analogical materials.
Although the common law is, above all, an exercise in reason,
lawyers and judges like to find some piece of authoritative text,
or some historical practice, the existence of which suggests the
nature of the underlying policy that might usefully extend to
the issue before them. So, for example, when the Supreme
Court federalized state law affecting the foreign relations of the
United States, the Court sought justification in the fragments
of constitutional text lodging foreign relations powers in the
political branches.147And so, when the Supreme Court authorized judicial federal lawmaking in maritime cases of wrongful
death, it suggested that courts in future cases glean national
policy on the issues presented in those cases from such suggestions of national policy as could be inferred from preexisting
analogous acts of Congress.'" Sometimes the Court suggests
that in fashioning federal common law, courts should refer to
analogous preexisting cases.14'

147. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (even
though the "act of state doctrine" is not found in the Constitution of the United
States, it does have "'constitutional' underpinnings").
148. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 406 (1970) (recognizing a new federal common-law action for wrongful death; suggesting that
judges fashioning new rules of decision for such cases consult the policies underlying analogous federal wrongful death statutes). Interestingly, Justice Harlan was
the author of both Sabbatino and Moragne. See also Textile Workers Union of
America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957):
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under 5 301(a)
is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law . . . . Other problems will lie in the penumbra
of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction
but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy . . . . Any state law applied
. . . will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent
source of private rights.
Id. a t 456-57 (Douglas, J.) (citations omitted).
149. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943):
In absence of an applicable act of Congress it is for the federal courts
to fashion the governing rule of law . . . . [Wlhile the federal law merchant, developed for about a century under the regime of Swift v. Tyson,
represented general commercial law rather than a choice of a federal rule
designed to protect a federal right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient
source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal
questions.
Id. a t 367 (Douglas, J.) (citations omitted).
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There is plenty of textual authorization, if that is what is
wanted, for Congress to devolve jurisdiction in both sets of
courts, over such currently unfederalized matters as mass tort.
There is the Commerce power,150the Fourteenth Amendment
power over due process in the state courts-including
Congress's power under Section 5; Congress's powers over federal courts in the Tribunals Clause of Article I and in Article
111; and (by parity of reasoning from the Fourteenth Amendment) in whatever powers may flow from the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Depending upon what is sought to be
accomplished, there may be other more specific sources of power.151
Certainly members of Congress have assumed that there is
national power adequate to the vindication of national interests
in mass torts, to continue with that example. Bill after bill has
been introduced that, if enacted, would have federalized the
substantive law of-for example-products liability, in whole or
in part, preempting or limiting state power.152And of course
Congress continually enacts regulatory legislation with potential impact upon state-law tort duties.153Congress long ago
150. Cf. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760 (1982) (holding that Congress has Commerce power to implement federal law in state tribunals; referring to
claims "analogous" to federal claims).
151. Setting to one side for the moment the subject of jurisdiction, suppose, for
example, that Congress seeks to enact uniform interstate choice-of-law rules. The
various powers of Congress to enact such rules would include whatever power is
conferred under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, which explicitly
grants to Congress the power to determine in what way the "acts," as well as "records" and "proceedings" of one state are to be given full faith and credit in another. U.S. CONST.art. IVY§ 1. Congress has recently exercised these powers in an
attempt to assist the states in administering family law. Parental Kidnapping Act
of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(a) (1988) (furnishing a rule of decision for the recognition of state custody decrees in another state); cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174 (1988) (holding that 4 1738(a) is only a rule of decision and does not
confer original jurisdiction upon federal courts).
152. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Jan. 4, 1995). At the time of this writing the substance of this bill has been
divided among several more specific proposals, including the Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, H.R. 917, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13,
1995). For commentary critical of these proposals, see Carl Tobias, Common Sense
and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1995). Earlier proposals include
Fairness in Products Liability Act of 1993, H.R. 1910, 103d Cong., 1st Sess (1993);
Product Liability Reform Act of 1990, S . 1400, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Uniform Product Liability Act of 1989, H.R. 1636, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); and
Lawsuit Reform Act of 1989, S. 1100, 10lst. Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
153. E.g., Children's Bicycle Helmet Safety Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. $9 6001-06
(Supp. 1995); Agmg Aircraft Safety Act of 1991, 49 U.S.C. 9 1421 (Supp. 1993); the
Highway Safety Act of 1991, 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-03, 410 (Supp. 1993); the Consumer
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used part of its power over multistate tort even in cases involving only individual accident rather than mass disaster, for
example, to address the tort duties of railroads as employers in
interstate commerce.
The pressure for federalization of mass torts is particularly
strong. Widespread but disuniform state tort reforms, coupled
with equally widespread state abandonment of uniform choiceof-law rules, has made rational administration of these cases a
remote dream. The difficulty is compounded by federal choiceof-law
and other impediments to mass adjudicat i ~ n . Congress
'~~
appears to be at a permanent impasse when

Product Safety Improvement Act of 1990, 15 U.S.C. $5 1193-94 & passim; the Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C.
5707, 15 U.S.C. $8 2201, 2203,
2224-25 (Supp. 1993).
154. See Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. $8 51-60 (1988).
155. For consolidated and transferred cases in federal courts, the federal common law of choice of law makes the mass disaster virtually unadministrable. Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), requires that in a state-law case transferred under § 1404(a) on motion of the defendant, the federal transferee court
apply the whole law of the transferor court's state, including its choice rules. Van
Dusen as a practical matter is applied in most transfer situations. The effect on
consolidated mass litigation is to require an individual choice of law under the
separate choice-of-law approach of each transferor forum state, for each issue in
the case.
Similarly, for the class suit in state courts, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797 (1985), requires choosing applicable law under the choice-of-law approach of a concerned jurisdiction for each issue in the case. It is not clear how
Shutts impacts upon federal courts administering state-law cases, since the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause requires contacts with the nation rather than the
state, and we do not know whether in state-law cases the Fifth Amendment incorporates the Fourteenth. With regard to the difficulties presented by Shutts in
state courts, see Duvall v. T.R.W., Inc., 578 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that a class should not have been certified in a product liability case
involving a defective truck steering mechanism, since the difficulties of choosing
law would create "enormous case management problems").
With regard to the difficulties Van Dusen imposes on federal courts, see I n re
San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D. P.R. 1990) ("In
this type of litigation, the application of choice of law standards turns into a colossal struggle for the transferee court . . . ."). In In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
19841, Judge Weinstein famously managed to
Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y.
appear simultaneously to follow Van Dusen while evading it, inventing a "national
consensus lawn which all concerned states "would" apply. But in the recent interesting case of In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), Judge
Posner thought that "Esperanto law" could not apply to all issues in a class case,
and ruled, over a strong dissent, that class certification should be denied in a
multistate case in part because the jury would be instructed under negligence
standards applied by no particular state. Id. a t 1300.
156. In federal courts, over and above such impediments to federal complex
litigation as the class action rule itself presents, Supreme Court decisions have
severely limited the utility of federal courts to plaintiffs seeking class treatment.
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it comes to federalizing comprehensive substantive law for
these cases; but in such circumstances it might be politically
more feasible for Congress to vest jurisdiction over mass torts
concurrently in federal and state courts, without substantively
federalizing mass torts. Whatever the national interests that
would justify substantive federalization of mass torts, the same
interests are likely to justify the vesting of jurisdiction in federal and even state courts without federalizing mass torts.
Although it is widely recognized that there is a national
interest in finding a way to deliver health services to the people of the United States, and although Congress might try to
impose some tort reforms upon medical malpractice litigation,
it would be at least controversial to say that Congress has
power to federalize the tort of medical malpractice. But mass
tort presents a much easier case for federalization than tort
law generally. That is true even when mass injuries are localized rather than dispersed; innumerable presidential declarations and emergency appropriations by Congress reflect the
understanding that a single state can suffer a national disaster.
So, assuming authorization, the issue, rather, is the existence of any national interest in federalizing mass tort liability,
or at least the litigation of mass tort liability. If Congress were
comprehensively to federalize multistate tort cases substantively, the fundamental purposes of the legislation presumably
would have to do with enforcing national goals of safety in the
interstate transportation networks and in the national market
for products; in the fairness and integrity of national markets
for securities or services; and in the safety of air and water.
These fundamental policies are not merely the policies underly-

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U S . 156 (1974) (notice must be sent a t the
named plaintiff's expense to all reasonably identifiable members of the class in a
class action for damages under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)); Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U S . 291 (1973) (each member of the plaintiff class in a diversity action
under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) must meet the statutory jurisdictional amount); Snyder
v. Harris, 394 U S . 332 (1969) (in a diversity class action, claims of the class may
not be aggregated in determining the existence of the statutory jurisdictional
amount); see supra note 33. But see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 US.
356 (1921) (diversity of citizenship between the defendant and the named representative of the class is sufficient to ground diversity jurisdiction regardless of the
citizenship of absentee class members). Beyond these rulings there is the common
understanding in both federal and state courts that cases of mass personal injury
are unsuitable for class certification because they have a tendency to present individual claims too valuable to be precluded by class judgments.
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ing tort law generally, but are true national policies reflecting
national concerns about the potential impact on the nation's
markets of any declining confidence in their safety, fairness, or
integrity that might result from impeded access to effective
courts when those markets have a failure.
The existence of a national interest in the efficacy of justice
in such cases does not delete these more fundamental substantive concerns; rather, the need for effective litigation arises,
precisely, from the substantive national interests in the safety,
fairness, and integrity of interstate markets. Of course countervailing enterprise- and development-protecting interests might
justify Congress in including so-called "tort reform" measures
to constrain mass tort litigation or alter its ground rules.
In sum, whatever national interests support the federalization of mass tort liabilities will be attended by interests that
would furnish at least part of the case for the federalization of
litigation of mass tort liabilities.

We have been considering the role of the national interest
in empowering Congress to "confer" original jurisdiction upon
state courts over a class of cases likely to arise under law that
is not federal law. In this Part we will briefly consider possible
alternative theories of power. My intention is not to show that
alternative theories are not helpful, but rather to demonstrate
that better theory is available. The Ptolemaic theory that the
sun and the planets moved around the earth was wonderfully
useful; but when Galileo saw the phases of Venus in his little
telescope he knew for once and for all what he had long suspected: the Copernican theory was better. The system revolved
around the sun, not the earth. It was the earth that
moved. 157

157. "All the same, it moves (E pur si muove)," Galileo is said to have muttered after the Roman Inquisition permitted him to recant his Copernican heresies
in exchange for a sentence of life under house arrest. Three and a third centuries
later, when asked how he felt after undergoing hip surgery, Pope John Paul I1
said, "But see, it moves." Gannett News Services (LEXIS), Sept. 16, 1995.
At the prompting of my able editors I should acknowledge the limitations of
my metaphor. Copernicus's theory was "bettern than Ptolemy's only in the sense
that it was more directly and simply descriptive of reality. Both theories were only
Aristotelian metaphysics. For theory with explanatory power the world had to wait
for Newton. But I do stick up for Galileo, who by himself made the world "move"
by beginning to do real science. Anyway I am deeply gratified by the suggestion
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A. The Irrelevance of Constitutional Text
1. Article I

It is not a question of finding some express delegation in
Article I or elsewhere in the Constitution. If Congress enacted
an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the state courts over a subject exclusively governed by state law, we would be skeptical
enough to question the jurisdiction even if Congress explicitly
relied upon any of its several more-or-less express constitutional powers over the state courts. As we have seen, there is plenty of textual authorization, surely. There is the commerce power. There is the Tribunals Clause of Article I. There is the
Fourteenth Amendment power over due process in the state
courts, notably including the explicit grant of power to Congress under section 5. Under one or another of these Congress
arguably could purport to vest jurisdiction in the state courts
quite freely, and we would still question the constitutionality of
a particular grant as applied to a case arising exclusively under
state law. We would feel that something more than a piece of
constitutional text is needed.
It helps enormously, of course, if Congress in granting
jurisdiction can rely upon some more substantive power: its
power over foreign relations in the case of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
its powers over national markets and
national disasters in the case of the ALI Proposal. Congress's
substantive powers are helpful not because constitutional text
delegating or implying those powers will satisfy our minds, but
because the acknowledgment of national power in some authoritative text is evidence of the likely national interest that gave
rise to it. But even when the Constitution makes a national
power explicit, we read meaning into the delegation only to the
extent we can understand it as a reflection of some existing
national concern. Only when we see that a matter is within the
sphere of national governmental interest will we be satisfied
that there is national power to govern it.

that the argument of this paper is Newtonian rather than Copernican.
158. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492-93
(1983) (justifying jurisdiction on the basis of the foreign relations and international
commerce powers of Congress).
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2. Article 111

If we move on to the context of federal jurisdiction over
state-law question^,'^^ perhaps we can see more clearly the
inadequacy of constitutional text, without more, to legitimize
an exercise of power, including a grant of jurisdiction to courts.
For this purpose and for the separate purposes of the remaining Parts of this article, discussion fi-om this point on will deal
with cases on federal, rather than on state, jurisdiction. But
this discussion of federal jurisdiction will remain relevant to
the inquiry into. state jurisdiction with which we began; the
focus will be on cases in which Congress has granted concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The question becomes, then, what is the relevance of Article I11 to what has been said thus far?
For background here it will be necessary for me to touch
upon the classic case of Osborn v. Bank of the United
States.160 That case, together with Planters' Bank of Georgia,16' its companion case, traditionally is remembered16' as
159. Implicitly assuming that the "arising under" powers of Article I11 are
insufficient to justify grants of federal jurisdiction over mass torts, earlier commentators recommended expansive readings of the "diversity" powers. The leading article is Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986).
160. 22 U S . (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
161. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
904 (1824). The problem of federal jurisdiction over an ordinary state-law action on
the contract was actually presented not in Osborn, but in this companion case.
Osborn nevertheless is the case conventionally cited for the proposition that Congress has Article I11 power to grant federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising
under state law, if the defendant is a national instrumentality, since its capacity to
sue or be sued is a federal-law "ingredientn of a case by or against the instrumentality.
162. Osborn itself was an action by a branch of the Bank in Ohio to restrain
collection of an unconstitutional Ohio tax. As such it clearly was within the broad
Article I11 powers of federal courts, a t least under modern understandings that a
claim for an injunction must state a cause of action. See Justice Harlan's post-Erie
flash of insight about federal equitable remedial rights in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 400 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("However broad a federal court's discretion concerning equitable remedies,
it is absolutely clear-at least after Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)-that in a nondiversity suit a federal court's power to grant even equitable
relief depends on the presence of a substantive right derived from federal law.").
The reasoning behind the broad construction of Article 111 is that the Supreme
Court must have Article I11 appellate power over a federal question, even when
that question is a narrow sub-issue in a case. Thus, there is Article I11 jurisdiction
over a state-law tort action alleging negligence per se, when the statutory violation
grounding the per se allegation is a violation of a federal statute. Cf: Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), pointing out that an alle-
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deciding per Chief Justice Marshall that an ordinary state-law
action on a contract by a federal instrumentality "arises under"
federal law for purposes of satisfying Article 111.
There are two separate messages one might glean from
Osborn. Either all suits involving federal instrumentalities
"arise under," a possibility to which I shall return later, or
cases "arise under" when they include some "ingredient" of
federal law, notwithstanding that on the merits the rights of
the parties are exclusively determinable under state law. In
Osborn, the federal "ingredient" was the issue of the Bank's
capacity to sue.163The act of Congress establishing the Bank
gave it capacity to sue. Chief Justice Marshall's theory of Article I11 jurisdiction was that the federal issue of the Bank's juridical capacity was a sufficient basis to hold that a case by a
branch of the Bank "arises under" federal law for purposes of
Article 111.
Chief Justice Marshall's "ingredient" theory of Article I11
jurisdiction is seductive when one sees, with him, that the
Supreme Court must have power to review any federal question, even one that, at the time of filing of the complaint, arises
only potentially, perhaps by way of defense, even in a state-law
case, even in state court. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned, federal trial courts must have the same broad Article I11
power. Dissenting in Osborn, Justice Johnson complained that
Osborn trashes Article I11 as a limiting principle; virtually any
state-law claim potentially raises some federal question. 164
Perhaps for this reason, Osborn's "ingredient" theory of Article
I11 jurisdiction was not very prominent in our thinking until, in
1982, the Supreme Court surprised the lower courts165by

gation of a federal statutory violation sufficient to raise a rebuttable presumption
of negligence under state law is a question "arising under" federal law, a n "ingredient" that under art. I11 might give the Supreme Court the power of review, id. a t
807, but distinguishing the case a t bar because federal statutory "arising under" jurisdiction is narrower and must arise on the face of the well-pleaded complaint;
noting, further, that there is no federal cause of action for a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id. a t 811.
163. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) a t 822, 824.
164. Id. at 875 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("[Iln all such cases, there is not only
a possibility, but a probability, that a question may arise, involving the constitutionality, construction, &c. of a law of the United States. If the circumstance, that
the questions which the case involves, are to determine its character, whether
those questions be made in the case or not, then every case . . . may as well be
transferred to the jurisdiction of the United States, as those to which this Bank is
a party").
165. 461 US. 480 (1983) (reversing the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
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dredging it up from the distant past. The case was Verlinden v.
Central Bank of Nigeria?
Verlinden was a case under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and that statute, as we have seen, contemplates state
as well as federal jurisdiction, subject to re1nova1.l~~
The Article I11 problem in Verlinden was that the statute provides for
liability in tort or contract under the law which would have
determined liability had the defendant been a private person.168Thus, under the Act, the ordinary expectation is that
state or foreign law will determine liability. In Verlinden, the
Supreme Court laid it down that cases under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act nevertheless "arise under7' federal law
within the meaning of Article 11I.l~'Citing Osborn, Chief Justice Burger reasoned, for the Verlinden Court, that the immunity of a defendant sovereign is an "ingredient7' of federal law
that must be decided "at the outset" of every case.'?'
As an "ingredient theory" case, Verlinden in fact makes
more sense than Osborn. One would suppose that stare decisis
would establish the juridical capacity of a plaintiff branch of
the Bank of the United States after the first case brought by
that branch. But the immunity of a defendant sovereign in an
action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act involves an
cuit). For an earlier critique of the Second Circuit's position, see Note, Subject
Matter Jurisdiction and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 68 VA. L.
REV. 893 (1982).
166. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
167. 28 U.S.C. 8 1441(d) (1988).
168. 28 U.S.C. 8 1606 provides:
[Tlhe foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but . . . except for
an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages . . . . [Ilf, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law
of the place where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been
construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign
state shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages . . . .
Id. (emphases added). These provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
are construed as intending that federal law not apply. Cf.First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983)
(O'Connor, J.) (explaining that, although federal common law must govern threshold statutory issues such as the amenability of a particular governmental instrumentality to suit, the liability of a statutory defendant is not to be determined
under federal law but rather under the law of the state or nation where the act or
omission occurred). These provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act substantially parallel the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
$8 1346(b), 2674 (1988), as amended.
169. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
170. Id. a t 492, 493 (Burger, C.J.).
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inquiry specific to the facts of the particular case,171 and in
every case would have to be established under the statute's
complex standards.172 The national interest in assuring defendant sovereigns in this country that they will be held liable
only for their nongovernmental acts is advanced by the express
provision that those same federal standards of immunity will
govern in both sets of ~ 0 u r t s . l ~ ~
Just the same, Verlinden remains unconvincing. A glimpse
a t the facts will help to explain why. Verlinden arose when
Nigeria could not continue to take deliveries of vast quantities
of cement for which its agents had contracted. The Nigerian
authorities notified sellers and factors that they would not accept further deliveries of cement. One of the cement owners,
Verlinden, a Dutch company, decided to bring suit in this country. Numerous other Nigerian cement claims were pending
here as well.174This exercise in shopping for effective courts
was encouraged by the then recent Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, since the statute makes commercial disputes
against foreign sovereigns, if arising out of non-governmental
activities,lT5triable in this country.
But the statute also requires that the alleged activities
occur here or have direct effects here.lY6To the Dutch company this meant that it needed to connect its case somehow with
American territory. There was only one such connection: Under
the terms of Verlinden's contract with Nigeria, Nigeria had
placed a letter of credit on deposit with a New York bank. So
Verlinden framed its claim-at bottom a simple action for

171. Under the Act, a defendant sovereign is amenable to ordinary tort suits
only if the activity giving rise to the suit was commercial activity conducted in this
country or having direct effects in this country. 28 U.S.C. 5 1605(a)(2).
172. The mechanistic argument might be made that Verlinden's "ingredient"
theory could sustain federal "arising undern jurisdiction over mass torts in complex
litigation, since a t the "outset" of every case, federal requirements for transfer and
consolidation would have to be met. The argument seems unsound. It is hard to
see how limits upon the exercise of federal jurisdiction can be construed as grounding federal jurisdiction.
173. Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t 488; 28 U.S.C. 1604. Similarly, the Immunities
Act's limitation of liability to compensatory damages only in personal-injury and
death cases is applicable in both sets of courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1606.
174. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300, 310-13 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
175. The statute is intended to codify the "restrictive" view of sovereign immunity, opening a foreign sovereign to suit only for its nongovernmental wrongs.
Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t 487-88; 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
176. 28 U.S.C. 8 1605(a)(2).
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breach of contract obviously governed by either Nigerian or
Dutch law-as one for anticipatory breach of Nigeria's letter of
credit.
This piece of smart pleading should not be allowed to confuse the issue. The letter of credit was incidental to the agreement of the parties, as was the state of New York and the
temporary deposit of a letter of credit in a bank there. Even if
the deposit somehow enabled New York to pick up an interest
in governance of this dispute,177the United States itself had
about as much interest in it as you do.
Seeing those facts, I think what we feel wanting in
Verlinden has little to do with Article 111. What we feel wanting is a convincing argument from the national interest. We
want to see what national interest justifies a federal district
court in asserting statutory jurisdiction over a case that depends for substantive governance on the law of contracts of
either Holland or Nigeria, when neither party is an American,
and none of the events relevant to the agreement or breach has
occurred in this country.

B. The Relevance of Nexus
Although Verlinden leaves the database after the Supreme
Court's decision, the inevitable question arises whether-had
the parties continued their struggle on remand-even the statutory requirements of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
would have been met. In order to ground a finding of sovereign
immunity under the statute, Nigeria would have had to show
only that its refusal to accept Verlinden's cement did not have
direct effects in the United States in order to win a quick dismissal under the statute.17' It is true that in the Weltover

177. See, e.g., the much-criticized casebook classic, In re Jones's Estate, 182

N.W. 227 (Iowa 1921) (applying Iowa law, on the strength of a temporary deposit
of the decedent's funds a t an Iowa bank, to be paid to him on his return to the
country of his birth, to a dispute between two Welsh claimants over the estate of
a n intestate decedent who went down with the Lusitania).
178. See Verlinden, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
179. 28 U.S.C. 8 1330(a) (1988). Under the Act, "sovereign immunity is a n
affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded," H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 a t 17.
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t 493-94
& n.20, subject-matter jurisdiction under the Act "turns on the existence of a n
exception to foreign sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. 5 1330(a). Accordingly, even if
the foreign state does not enter an appearance to assert a n immunity defense, a
district court still must determine that immunity is unavailable under the Act."
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caselgOthe Court held that the statute's requirement of "direct effects" was not a requirement of "substantial" or "foreseeable" effects; but the Court did hold that the statutory effects
must be the "immediate consequence of defendant's activity."lgl Moreover, Weltover arose on very different facts from
those of Verlinden. Weltover was a dispute over the restructuring of the very debt that was represented by the bonds payable
in this country. It was not about supply and delivery of foreign
goods abroad for foreign purposes.lg2In other words, the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act requires a nexus between the
case and the United States.lg3
When American law requires a nexus between the forum
and the case before it, the purpose of the requirement is to help
ensure the reasonableness of an assertion of forum power-to
avoid arbitrary or irrational governance.'" But surely the
Constitution requires non-arbitrary, rational governance as a
matter of due process. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments protect respectively against irrational assertions of federal or state power. The point is to weed
out governance that is so irrelevant as to amount to a denial of
due process. As the Supreme Court puts this test of substantive
due process in the context of state legislative power under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state must have a contact or contacts with the facts of a case, generating a governmental interest or interests, such that governance by the state on those
180. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
181. Id. at 618.
182. The place of performance of a contract may well be an interested sovereign in an action on the contract; as Brainerd Currie once remarked, a contract to
dance naked in the streets of Rome cannot be performed without reference to the
laws of Rome.
183. 28 U.S.C. $ 1605 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the states in any case-

...

(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States . . . .
184. Cf. the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $9 702, 706(2)(A) (providing federal judicial review over federal agency action that is "arbitrary and capricious .")
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facts will be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.lB5
This fundamental requirement of reasonableness, under whatever constitutional language it is imposed, and however it is
expressed, is as applicable to federal186as to state assertions of
governmental power.18'
Once we internalize this very basic premise, it becomes
easier to see what has been missing from the cases and much
of the commentary on the powers of Congress over the subject185. I am paraphrasing the test laid down in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 313 (1981), and repeated in Phillips Petroleum Co. v, Shutts, 472 U S .
797, 818 (1985). The line of thinking goes back a t least to Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 US. 397 (1930) (holding under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment that a state may not govern a contract case if it is without significant
contacts with the contract or the parties).
For an interesting recent elaboration of nexus requirements in the context of
the power to tax, see Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2286
(1994) (sustaining under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
California's worldwide combined reporting requirement for calculation of its corporate franchise tax where taxpayers had an adequate nexus with the State. That is,
the tax was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, fairly related to the services
provided by the State, and its imposition did not inevitably result in multiple taxation).
186. Cfi, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (sustaining
the constitutionality of a federal mandatory minimum penalty for distribution of
LSD imposed under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, in part on the ground that
"Congress had a rational basis for its choice of penalties for LSD distribution").
The classic cases are Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147, 151-54 (1938) (Stone, J.)
(sustaining an act of Congress under various due process challenges; stating that
"regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators").
187. See supra note 186; cf. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
(striking down under the Commerce Clause, as without rational basis, the GunFree School Zones Act of 1990, which forbids "any individual knowingly to possess
is a school zone," 18 U.S.C.
a firearm a t a place that [he] knows .
0 922(q)(l)(A)):
But even these modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits . . . . Since that time, the Court has heeded that
warning and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.
Id. a t 1628-29 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citations omitted); see also id. a t 1653 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("In due process litigation, the Court's statement of a rational basis test
came quickly. . . . The parallel formulation of the Commerce Clause test came later. . . .") (citations omitted); id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Courts must give
Congress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual
connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce . . . . The traditional words 'rational basis' capture this leeway.").

..
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matter jurisdiction of courts. If the assertion rings hollow to
you that Congress can give jurisdiction to courts over state-law
cases over which those courts otherwise would not have had
jurisdiction, it is because it is too bald an assertion. What is
wanting is a convincing argument from the national interest.
We would like to see a rational basis for the act of Congress. We would like to see a nexus between a particular case
in which the conferred jurisdiction is challenged, and the particular goals Congress is trying to achieve by conferring the
particular jurisdiction. If the holding in Verlinden, notwithstanding the obvious inevitability of some sort of "ingredient" theory of Article 111, remains unconvincing to us, it is not
because Verlinden does not contain a federal ingredient, or
because that federal ingredient is insufficient to fall within the
"arising under" language of Article I11 as interpreted in Osborn,
but rather because we do not see any national interest in the
taking of jurisdiction in Verlinden. The fact that Article 111,
without more, has been sufficient to preserve federal courts
from jurisdiction over innumerable cases outside the national
interest is a happy incident of the adroitness of the Framers,
but it should not be allowed to obscure the necessity of identifylng a national interest to justify application of an act of
Congress, including an act of Congress conferring jurisdiction.
As cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts
show, that question is one that can and must be isolated from
Article III.ls8

C. A Useful Hypothetical
Recall that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
there is concurrent jurisdiction over cases like Verlinden in
both state and federal courts. Suppose that the Dutch seller,
for unknown tactical reasons, files its suit in New York in the
state court, and that, also for unknown tactical reasons, Nigeria makes no attempt to remove the case to federal court.

188. For similar perspectives expressed almost two centuries apart, compare
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tlhe present act [states], 'in all State Courts having competent jurisdiction, and in any Circuit Court of the United States.' . . . But . . . the clause
could not have been intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the State Courts, and
therefore could not have been intended to enlarge that of the federal Courts.") with
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (complaining that Judge Bork's concurrence "completely overlooks the
jurisdiction of the state courts").
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Instead, Nigeria moves to dismiss, challenging the constitutionality of the jurisdictional grant by Congress on the facts of the
particular case. Nigeria argues that Congress lacks power to
subject it to jurisdiction in this country when this country has
no significant contact with the case.
We do know that, as an initial proposition,189under the
Supremacy Clause the state court must take the federal
case,lgOif the jurisdictional grant is constitutional as applied

189. The exceptions to the duty of state courts to adjudicate federal claims are
only procedural or otherwise off the merits. This follows in part from the fact that
defenses on the merits fall a t once, under the Supremacy Clause. The further
thinking behind the procedural exception is that federal law takes the state courts
as it finds them. The theory is that nothing in federal law requires states to build
courts; thus, even if a state has courts, it is obliged to enforce federal law only
insofar as its own jurisdictional and procedural law permits. Hence the doctrine of
the "otherwise valid excuse," under which it is held that a state that would dismiss an analogous state-law claim on procedural grounds may similarly dismiss a
federal claim. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U S . 377, 387-88 (1929).
This thinking is flawed, as I have tried to show elsewhere. See my widely
ignored Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70
TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1773-76 (1992); see also S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV.
829, 879-80 (1992) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause serves as a toggle, switching supremacy on when issues become federalized, and that Supreme Court doctrines in excess of this only produce confusion). For one thing, there is no courtless
state. For another, the Supremacy Clause arguably does require a state to have
courts. For a third, once we see the force of federal supremacy on the merits, of
necessity we begin to see the force of federal supremacy over state procedures that
might affect outcomes on the merits. E.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U S . 229, 238 (1969) (Douglas, J.) ("[The] federal [equitable] remedy for the
protection of a federal right is available in the state court, if that court is empowered to grant injunctive relief generally . . . ."); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 US. 359 (1952) (holding that a state must afford trial by jury
in a case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act even on an issue deemed
unsuitable for the jury under state standards). Thus, I question the cases holding
that a state should be permitted to dismiss a federal case for forum non conveniens, even if the federal courts would not. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v.
Mayfield, 340 U S . 1 (1950); Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U S . 377,
387-88 (1929). What I am saying is that it does not matter to their obligation to
try federal cases whether or not the state courts have tried similar state-law cases.
It is a very different question whether a state should be permitted to try a
case that federal courts would dismiss. E.g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114
S. Ct. 981 (1994) (holding in an admiralty case that federal law on forum non
conveniens does not preempt state law not recognizing that doctrine). Indeed, a
state court is under special obligation to try a federal claim in the absence of a
federal forum. This may be as much a matter of due process, see supra note 8, as
a matter of supremacy, see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
190. Testa v. Katt, 330 U S . 386, 387 (1947) (holding that a state must adjudicate a federal statutory claim when Congress grants jurisdiction to "any court of
competent jurisdiction"); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U S . 356 (1990) (holding that
a state court may not immunize from suit under federal civil-rights law a defen-
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in the particular case. But is the jurisdictional grant to state
courts constitutional in cases like this hypothetical variant of
Verlinden? If not, what can save it in the real Verlinden? Even
if you think New York might have some rational basis of its
own for trying the case, the question is whether Congress has a
rational basis for requiring a court in this country to hear
Verlinden7s case. In thinking about the power of Congress in
our hypothetical case, obviously nothing in Article 111, and
nothing in the analysis in Verlinden, can help us to answer it.
We see this at once, as an obvious fact, without any of the
usual confision, because state courts are not Article I11 courts.
But that means that this same constitutional question about
the power of Congress was never answered in Verlinden.
I am saying that the power of Congress to grant federal
jurisdiction must be controlled at a deeper level than Article I11
by concepts of substantive due process.

FROM
THE NATIONALINTEREST
VI. REASONING
A. The Example of Verlinden
What was the national interest, if any, in taking jurisdiction over Verlinden? The answer to that question depends on
the reasons for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. When
granting jurisdiction, just as when enacting substantive legislation, Congress must provide for "the general Welfare"lgl of
"the People of the United States."lg2In cases like Verlinden,
Congress could do so by creating a forum for the enforcement of
contracts Americans may enter into with any foreign sovereign
anywhere;lg3or, for the enforcement of the contracts with foreign sovereigns of those foreigners whom we welcome to the
dant not immune under federal law).
191. "We start from the settled proposition that the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts is determined by Congress 'in the exact degrees and
character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.'" Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 (1989) (quoting Cary
v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845)).
192. U.S. CONST. preamble.
193. The House Report refers to the growing number of disputes between
"American citizensn and foreign states, and expresses the desire to ensure "our
citizens . . . access to the courts." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 a t 6. See, e.g., Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310-13 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (finding the statutory requirement of
"direct effects" in this country, 28 U.S.C. !j 1605(a)(2) (1988), to be satisfied in a
case similar to Verlinden except that the plaintiff was an American cement supplier).
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United States to make or perform those contracts.'" Of
course all law has limits. For reasons of foreign policy, Congress also would seek in creating such forums to ensure that
they are well-regulated forums. Congress would want to protect
foreign sovereigns from excessive litigation, or litigation giving
the appearance of local bias, or litigation under disuniform
standards of sovereign immunity.lg5 In accordance with these
purposes, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act codifies the
"commercial activities" exception to the common-law doctrine of
sovereign immunity;lg6confers jurisdiction upon both federal
and s t a t e courts;lg7 provides world-wide service of
process;'98 provides for removal by the defendant sovereign;"' and provides a single uniform standard of sovereign
immunity applicable in all courts.200But Congress could not
constitutionally have created, and did not intend to create, an
international court of claims in cases in which the nation had
no interest at
A shorthand way of describing the difference the statute
makes would be to say that it opens the foreign sovereign to
some of the liabilities a private person might be subject to in
our courts in similar circumstances. It is very hard, then, to
say that we should construe the statute to subject a foreign
sovereign to suit in a case in which we would subject no private

194. The statute limits its otherwise seemingly universal coverage to cases
having substantial contact with the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 9 1605.
195. Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t 492 (1983) (describing the defendant-protective
interests of Congress).
196. 28 U.S.C. $5 1605, 1607.
197. 28 U.S.C. 5 1330 (vesting federal courts with original jurisdiction not
exclusive in terms over cases against foreign sovereigns); 9 1441(d) (vesting federal
courts with removal jurisdiction over cases against foreign sovereigns that are first
filed in state courts); 5 1605 (creating uniform standards of immunity applicable in
both federal and state courts).
198. 28 U.S.C. 9 1608.
199. 28 U.S.C. 5 1441(d).
200. 28 U.S.C. $9 1604-05, 1607; Verlinden, 461 U S . a t 489.
201. Congress was aware of concern that "our courts [might be] turned into
small 'international courts of claims' . . . open . . . to all comers to
litigate any dispute which any private party may have with a foreign
state anywhere in the world...." Congress protected against this danger
not by restricting the class of potential plaintiffs, but rather by enacting substantive provisions requiring some form of substantial contact
with the United States.
Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t 490 (quoting Testimony, Bruno A. Ristau, Hearings,
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations., House Judiciary
Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976); referring to 28 U.S.C. 5 1605).
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person to suit in our courts in similar circumstances. The national interests that support provision of a well-regulated forum for certain suits against foreign sovereigns by Americans
wherever the parties transacted, or by foreigners transacting
here, cannot support the provision of a forum, however wellregulated, for foreigners' suits here against foreign governments, even over disputes arising out of nongovernmental activities, when those activities are conducted abroad and have
no direct effects within this country. And if the private defendant without a significant contact with this country is protected
from having to submit to its governance, then the foreign sovereign must be similarly protected. At a minimum both must be
protected by the basic substantive due process guarantee
against arbitrary or unreasonable assertions of governmental
power.
Against this background, it becomes evident that Verlinden
was wrongly decided on its facts. Jurisdiction in that case was
unsustainable, as we have seen, under the statute itself, for
want of the nexus with the United States that Congress required. And for the same reason jurisdiction was unsustainable
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even if
it was sustainable under Article 111. Whether or not the
Verlinden Court "correctly" found Article I11 jurisdiction will
not help us over the difficulty-one of substantive due process-that a court in this country could not exercise any sort of
jurisdiction over Verlinden that would not be arbitrary and
irrational.

B. Justice O'Connor Tries Her Hand
In the post-Verlinden Article I11 cases we can see the Supreme Court struggling toward some such recognition of the
need to identify a national interest to justifjr an assertion of
national power.
The background here also traces back to Osborn, but it
follows the other strand of thinking for which Osborn is cited;
that cases against federal agents or instrumentalities "arise
under" for Article I11 purposes. In 1885, in the Pacific Railroad
Removal Cases,202the Supreme Court had even extended this
latter reading of Osborn to cover federally chartered railroad
stock companies. But thirty years later, in 1915, Congress

202. 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
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partially overrode that view, requiring, at least in the case of a
railroad, that the United States own at least half the capital
Despite the narrowness of this legislation, it had the effect
of putting the "agents-or-instrumentalities" reading of Osborn
under a cloud, much as the alternative "ingredient" reading of
Osborn had been before Verlinden breathed new life into it in
1983. In 1989 the Supreme Court gave the agents-or-instrumentalities theory what one might have supposed to be its coup
de grke. The case was Mesa v. California.204
Mesa should have been a somewhat easier case for federal
jurisdiction than Verlinden, to the extent that the statute invoked in Mesa seemed explicitly to support federal jurisdict i ~ n , ~unlike
' ~ the jurisdictional statute in Verlinden. But in
Mesa, the Supreme Court came close to holding that if there is
no national interest justifying an exercise of jurisdiction on the
particular facts, clear statutory language under explicit constitutional authority will not save it.
Mesa began in state criminal prosecutions against two
truck drivers working for the United States postal service. One
of the drivers in the course of her government employment had
negligently caused the death of a bicyclist and was charged
with misdemeanor manslaughter. The other driver, within the
course of his employment, had collided with a police car, and
was charged with speeding. Both defendants removed to federal
court under the federal officer-removal statute.'06 Notwith-

203.
(1988)).
204.
205.
206.

Act of 1915, ch. 22,

5 5, 38 Stat. 803-04 (codified a t 28 U.S.C. 9 1349

489 U.S. 121 (1989).
This was the federal officer-removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 5 1442(a).
The statute provides:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court
against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any oficer of the United States or any agency thereof, or
person acting under him, for any act under color of such office . . . .
Id. The purpose of 5 1441(a) and its various predecessor statutes was to protect
federal officials from state courts in which locals might be hostile-not to the federal officer as such, but rather to the federal governmental function the officer was
performing a t the time of the alleged wrong or crime. Federal officer removal was
first authorized to deal with local hostility to what would come to be called federal
"revenuers." In 1815, during a time of deep resentment in the New England states
against federal duties, and against the embargo on trade with England, Congress
enacted a temporary measure providing for removal of cases against federal cus-
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standing the clear language of the officer-removal statute, the
Court of Appeals ordered the case remanded.207In the Supreme Court, the drivers, of course, needed to argue that there
was federal jurisdiction. For this purpose they relied on the
agents-or-instrumentalities reading of Osborn v. Bank of the
United States.208The state argued, against this, that Osborn
should not be read to authorize federal removal mechanically
whenever the state criminal defendant happened to be a federal agent. Although Article III's "arising under" clause-the
state argued-extends federal judicial power to every issue of
national interest, there simply was no national interest in
furnishing a federal forum for the state's prosecution of these
two drivers.
Arguably Osborn's "ingredient" theory also was available to
the drivers in Mesa. There is a threshold issue of federal law in
every such case: whether a defendant federal employee's alleged tort occurred when she was acting in the course of her
employment as a federal officer. This is also certainly an issue
in every case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, both before
and after the Westfall Act of 1988.~~'
That this is so after the Act can be seen in Gutierrez de
Martinez u. L a r n a g n ~ . ~Recall
'~
that in Lamagno the Court

toms officials. In one form or another this jurisdiction was available for the duration of the War of 1812. In 1833, as hostility to federal revenue collection was
intensifying secessionist pressures in South Carolina, Congress provided for federal
removal of state prosecutions against federal revenue officials. In Tennessee v.
Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879), the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
federal officer removal in a case in which the defendant revenuer had killed a
citizen of the state in the course of confiscating an illegal distillery. In the wake of
the Civil War, the hostility of southern courts to federal officials performing duties
under the Reconstruction Acts led to the more general precursors of 5 1441(a).
The Mesa Court saw, citing Maryland v. Soper (No. 21, 270 U S . 36, 43-44
(1926), that the purpose of the statute, narrowly construed, was to protect, not
federal officers as such, but rather their federal functions. Mesa, 489 U.S. a t 12728. Nevertheless the Court assumed the statutory purposes to encompass protection
for a federal official attempting to assert a federal defense even in today's state
courts-in most of which the constitutional presumption of local bias, seen in Article III's provision of diversity jurisdiction, might be thought fanciful.
For pre-Mesa discussion of earlier jurisprudence, see Kenneth S. Rosenblatt,
Removal of Criminal Prosecutions of Federal Oficials: Returning to the Original
Intent of Congress, 28 SANTACLARAL. REV. 21 (1989).
207. California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1987).
208. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
209. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(commonly known as the Westfall Act), Pub. L. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563-67; see
supra notes 41-46, 66-69 and accompanying text.
210. 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding judicially reviewable an
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held judicially reviewable, in Federal Tort Claims Act cases,
the Attorney General's certification that an employee was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the alleged tort."' Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the
Lamagno Court. In a part of her Lamagno opinion for a plurality only,''' Justice Ginsburg also used this "ingredient" argument in support of Article I11 jurisdiction in considering a
much more difficult question under Article 111, a devil of a
problem that, in Lamagno, was only hypothetical. By sustaining judicial review of the scope-of-employment issue, the Court
had, in effect, given federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of
unremandable removed claims which might, in fact, not be
federal at all. The federal court reviewing the Attorney
General's certification might hold it erroneous-that is, hold
that the employee was not acting within the scope of her federal employment at the time of the alleged tort. Before and after
the Westfall Act that case is clearly an ordinary state-law tort
case and is governed by state law operating of its own force.
Under the Act, such a case belongs in the exclusive jurisdiction
of the state court. If a federal court holds that the Attorney
General's scope-of-employment certification was in error, the
United States cannot remain substituted as defendant, any
more than it could have been substituted as defendant had the
Attorney General refused to certify scope of employment in the
first place. In this hypothesized federal case, the employee
must be restored as party defendant, and must stay on in federal court and defend alone, in an unremandable case governed
by state law.
Justice Ginsburg reached the question whether such federal jurisdiction could be sustained as "arising under" federal law
for purposes of Article 111. For the plurality, she reasoned that
the threshold question in every case under the Act-whether
the federal employee was within the scope of her federal employment-was
a federal question within the meaning of
Verlinden and Osborn. This federal question was sufficient a t
least to bring the case into federal court, and "considerations of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" were
sufficient to keep it there even afker a judicial determination

administrative determination of the issue of scope-of-employment in a case brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act as amended by the Westfall Act in 1988).
211. Id. at 2228.
212. Id. at 2236-37.

796

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

that the employee was not acting within the scope of her employ~nent.~'~
Thus, the plurality opinion in Lamagno furnishes some support for the "ingredient" theory in a case removed
by a federal employee.
In Mesa, in the different setting of the general officer-removal statute, the Government did not make an ingredienttheory argument. The Supreme Court roundly rejected the
agents-or-instrumentalities argument the Government did
make, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the unanimous Mesa Court, thought it
immaterial that these defendants happened to be federal officials falling within the literal language of the statutory jurisdictional grant. What concerned her was the want of national
interest in removing the case.214Even if there were some national party-protective interest, it would have to be balanced
against the considerable costs removal would impose upon the
prosecution, and against the strong federal policy disfavoring
federal interference with state criminal proceeding^.^'^ On
Justice
balance the national interest was in~ufficient.~'~
O'Connor thought that at a minimum the defendant must
plead some federal defense. But she also suggested that removal might have been warranted if the post office drivers could
have alleged local hostility to federal officials or to their partic-

213. Id. at 2237. Justice Souter, for the four dissenting Justices in Lamagno,
took strong issue with the plurality's reasoning, calling it circular. Id. a t 2240
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality's reasoning was "tantamount to
saying the authority to determine whether a Court has jurisdiction over the cause
of action supplies the very jurisdiction that is subject to challenge").
214. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).
215. Id. at 137-38. Notwithstanding the Mesa Court's emphasis on the costs
removal imposes on state prosecutors, id. a t 137-38, those costs are sufficiently
lower than the costs imposed by a federal injunction suit based on the same federal defense to warrant access to federal courts in removed cases but not in injunction suits. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (barring federal injunctions
interfering with pending state criminal proceedings). A removed criminal case can
proceed intact in the federal court. But a federal action in equity in which a preliminary injunction has issued will adjudicate the federal question only, and the
state prosecutor will be enjoined from trying the criminal case a t all.
216. Mesa, 489 US. a t 137-38 (O'Connor, J.):
(Wle do not recognize any federal interests that are not protected by
limiting removal to situations in which a federal defense is alleged. In
these prosecutions, no state court hostility or interference has even been
alleged by petitioners and we can discern no federal interest in potentially forcing local district attorneys to choose between prosecuting traffic
violations hundreds of miles from the municipality in which the violations
occurred or abandoning those prosecutions.
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ular function.217In Mesa, in sum, an overt interest analysis is
all the content Article I11 holds. Under Article 111, the Court in
Mesa simply attempted to discern a reasonable basis for the
lower court's removal jurisdiction and found none.

C. Justice Souter Loses the Thread

I . Red Cross and capacity clauses
Consider, now, the very different analysis in the 1992
American National Red Cross case.218There, a recipient of a
blood transfusion brought an action against the Red Cross to
recover for an AIDS infection allegedly caused by contaminated
reblood. The Red Cross, a federally chartered corp~ration,~'~
moved. Its charter gives the Red Cross the power "to sue and
be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within
the jurisdiction of the United States."220The Court of Appeals
held that insofar as the statute purported to give federal courts
jurisdiction over this state-law personal-injuries case without
regard to the citizenship of the parties, the statute was unconstitutional under Article III.221
The Supreme Court reversed, 5:4.Justice Souter's opinion
for the Court literalistically held, among other things, that "a
congressional charter's 'sue-and-be-sued' provision may be read
to confer federal court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically
mentions the federal courts."222Justice Scalia wrote a prolix

217. One might have supposed that Mesa overrules The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), insofar as those cases read Osborn as authorizing
removal by federal agents or instrumentalities even in the absence of a national
interest in the merits. The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases retain some scope beyond the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988) (limiting federal removal jurisdiction
over federally chartered railroads to companies in which the United States owns
over half the stock). But if Mesa did kill the agents-or-instrumentalities theory, the
Court was shortly to breathe life back into it. See American Nat'l Red Cross v.
S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992).
218. American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992). For interesting commentary on American Nat'l Red Cross, see Lorretta Shaw, A Comprehensive Theory of Protective Jurisdiction: The Missing "IngredientJJ of "Arising Under" Jurisdiction, 61 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1235 (1993).
219. 36 U.S.C.
1-17.
220. 36 U.S.C. $ 2.
221. S.G. & A.E. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494 (1st Cir. 1991).
222. American NatJl Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 255. This is an astonishing remark, and not only for its literalism. Although I read Justice Souter here as talking only about the sufficiency of the language that will achieve a vesting of jurisdiction, an over-enthusiastic reader might take him to be saying that explicit language is the only condition on the power of Congress, and that all it takes is
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and heated dissent focusing on the literalism of this wing of
Justice Souter's opinion, charging the majority with construing
law by "magic
but ironically bringing little further
to the problem before the Court than a different, more doctrinal
reading of the same text. Justice O'Connor, the author of Mesa,
joined in Justice Scalia's dissent; but one wishes she had dissented separately to give us the sort of rational analysis she
had deployed in Mesa.
2.

Red Cross and agents-or-instrumentalities

Justice Souter did not rely on the language of the capacity
clause alone. He thought the case controlled by Osborn, reading
Osborn for the proposition that "Article 111's 'arising under'
jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize Congress to confer
federal court jurisdiction over actions involving federally chartered corporation^."^^^ He argued that "Congress has surely
been entitled to rely" on Osborn and the long line of cases under it, and that Red Cross gave the Court "no reason to contemplate overruling" Osborn .225
This wing of Red Cross might seem particularly a t odds
with Mesa. But tucked away in a footnote is the special problem Justice Souter was trying to solve.226Congress had modified Osborn's agents-or-instrumentalities rationale, a t least for
federally chartered railroad stock companies.227 Justice
Souter agreed with the Court of Appeals that this legislation
had implications that were at least unclear for organizations
like the Red Cross that do not have stockholders. Indeed, this
legislation had put the agents-or-instrumentalities reading of
explicit language to give Congress power to trump the limits of Article 111. Only
three Justices have ever been found willing to say that Article I can trump Article
I11 in cases not arising under federal law. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 333 U.S. 860 (1948) (Jackson, J., for the plurality, joined only by Justices
Black and Burton) (arguing that Congress has Article I power to vest diversity jurisdiction in federal courts over cases in which a citizen of the District of Columbia
is a party).
223. Justice Scalia argued that the Court had disregarded the "natural reading" of a capacity clause referring generically to all courts. American Nat'l Red
Cross, 505 U.S. a t 265 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 264 (Souter, J.).
225. Id. at 265.
226. Id. at 251 n.2.
227. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1349 (limiting federal removal jurisdiction over federally
chartered railroads to companies in which the United States owns over half the
stock; overriding to that extent The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1
(1885)).
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Osborn under a cloud in the lower courts ever since it was
enacted.228
In Red Cross, then, the Court is telling the country that
Osborn's agents-or-instrumentalities theory is alive and well.
That is an intelligible holding. But if there is Article I11 "arising under" jurisdiction over federally chartered corporations, it
ought to exist whether or not the chartering statute mentions
"federal courts" explicitly. On the other hand, Chief Justice
Marshall had relied on explicit statutory language to sustain
and
~ one can swallow this on the
jurisdiction in O s b ~ r n ; ~
thinking that the Supreme Court can require Congress to
speak clearly. It may be appropriate to give narrow readings to
Article 111. But were it not for Justice Scalia's lengthy dissent
on the "magic words" issue, the reader might forget all about it.
Justice Souter fairly drops the issue after raising it, and his
thundering peroration on the continuing vitality of Osborn
never specifically mentions the supposed clear-statement requirement.230

3. Red Cross and the federal "ingredient"
By now a further question might be troubling the reader.
Why did the Red Cross Court finesse Osborn's "ingredient7'
theory? The "sue-and-be-sued" clause in Red Cross so plainly
invited the "ingredient" rationale. Under Osborn, Justice
Souter could have used the capacity clause not as a piece of
clear language, but rather to furnish a federal "ingredient:" the
threshold federal issue of the Red Cross's capacity. Of course by
now the juridical capacity of the Red Cross is not a real issue,
but the Bank's juridical capacity presented an equally unreal
issue in Osborn. As long as the Court was prepared to rely on
Osborn, why not rely on it whole hog?
Justice Souter shrugged off this possibility a t the outset of
his analysis. At the time when the sue-and-be-sued clause was
included in the Red Cross charter, he said, Congress did not
have to include it to ensure jurisdiction; the Red Cross already
was within federal jurisdiction under the decisional law then
Yet by
applicable because it was a federal instr~mentality.~~'

228. Lower federal courts were divided on the effect of $ 1349 in litigation
specifically against the Red Cross. American Nat'l Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 250 n.1.
229. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 818 (distinguishing an earlier case on this ground).
230. American Nat'l Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 264-65.
231. Id. at 251 (citing the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885)).
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analogy to Verlinden's sovereign-immunity "ingredient" and
Osborn's capacity "ingredient," the capacity "ingredienty'in Red
Cross seemingly should have been enough for Article I11 jurisdiction, whether or not Justice Souter is right that Congress
thought there would be jurisdiction even without the sue-andbe-sued clause.
What really stood in the way, we may speculate, was Mesa.
When I say this I do not mean to refer to the implicit federal
"ingredient" in Mesa. Recall that in that case, federal post office
drivers sought to remove their state criminal prosecutions to
federal court. In holding that there was no jurisdiction under
Article 111, the Government did not argue, and the Court did
not deal with, the federal threshold issue of scope-of-employment in every such case. As the Government saw, it was the
true difficulty of the position that scope of employment might
not be enough. Any national interest in taking jurisdiction
would have to overcome the countervailing national interests
Justice O'Connor identified in Mesa.232As the 1995 Lamagno
case233 makes plain, only four of the current Justices234
might be prepared to open federal courts to state-law tort cases
against federal employees on mere allegations that the tort
occurred while the defendant was acting within the scope of
federal employment.
When I say that Mesa stood in the way in Red Cross, I
mean, simply, that a federal party-protective policy failed to
justifjr jurisdiction in Mesa, but seems to do so in Red Cross.
Yet nothing in Red Cross confronts Mesa explicitly. Rather, it
appears that a majority of the Justices thought that cases
against the Red Cross must come within federal jurisdiction
anyway-but no majority could be found to overrule Mesa

232. See supra notes 204-08, 214-17 and accompanying text.
233. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995); see supra
notes 44-46, 65-69, 210-13 and accompanying text.
234. In Lamagno, Justice O'Comor concurred separately to distance herself
from the Court on the point, maintaining the consistency of her position in Mesa.
She disagreed with Justice Ginsburg's opinion that exclusive federal jurisdiction
would be constitutionally authorized in a state-law case irrevocably removed under
the Federal Tort Claims Act even after it was ascertained that the case did not
fall within the scope of the Act. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. a t 2227 (OYConnor,J., concurring). Thus, on this issue Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court becomes a
plurality opinion only.
It should be noted as well that Justice Ginsburg's Lamagno opinion does not
rely solely on an "ingredientn rationale. She buttresses her conclusion under Article
I11 with arguments about ancillary jurisdiction and efficiency.
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overtly. To be blunt about it, Red Cross is an intellectual muddle.
4. A better analysis
Whatever national interest supports the chartering of a
federal entity like the Red Cross might very well support the
furnishing of a federal forum for suits by or against that federal entity. In Red Cross, the question about national interest
needed to be asked. To the extent the Article I11 jurisdiction in
Red Cross is a party-protective jurisdiction, Red Cross, like
Verlinden, is a modern refutation of Justice Frankfurter's view
that the diversity grant exhausts the national interest in providing unbiased forums for litigation of nonfederal matters.235
Reasoning purposively for ourselves, we can speculate that
in chartering the Red Cross, Congress means to take advantage
of a cost-effective way of devolving some of the nation's need to
respond to national disasters upon an independent entity with
access to private funds. But to protect the public from the
entity's mistakes, and, a t the same time, to protect the entity
from local bias, Congress also sees an interest in giving the Red
Cross juridical capacity and furnishing it with the option of a
federal forum.
These identifiable national interests are what sustain the
jurisdiction in Red Cross, not the wording of the statute, or
Congress's entitlement to rely upon Osborn. A jurisdictional
statute vindicating national policies will be within the presumptive power of Congress even if it contains no express language about federal courts but simply gives jurisdiction to "any
competent
After all, we have seen the other side of
this coin. If there is no national interest in furnishing a federal
forum, no weight need be given even to express language purporting to do so, as Mesa holds. This suggests not merely that a

235. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 475 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting):
The theory [of protective jurisdiction] must have as its sole justification a belief in the inadequacy of state tribunals in determining state
law. The Constitution reflects such a belief in the specific situation within
which the Diversity Clause was confined. The intention to remedy such
supposed defects was exhausted in this provision of Article 111.
236. The example that comes immediately to mind is the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 34, as amended, 58 Stat. 632, 640, the basis of the
Rhode Island court's jurisdiction in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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rational basis is a threshold condition of Article I11 jurisdiction,
but even that Article I11 is satisfied when there is a rational
basis for a grant of federal jurisdiction.
VII. PROBLEMS
OF RAW JURISDICTIONAL
POWER
In this section I will press on and take the view that the
test of national interest, without more, should satisfy Article
111. This position raises the question whether a federal case can
"arise under7' a rationally-based but purely jurisdictional grant.
This issue comes up for the most part in cases questioning
the Article I power of Congress to confer jurisdiction upon federal courts within the limits of Article 111. By continuing to
refer our inquiry to the state courts as well, we become better
equipped to deal with the classic Article I11 problem of federal
courts, because we begin to see a way of generalizing it.
I think we are beginning to see that the effective, however
generous, measure of constitutional jurisdiction over state-law
cases in either set of courts is the presence of a national interest in affording the particular jurisdiction.
Interestingly, it is a real plus for the power of Congress
even over state courts that a given case within the ambit of
national policy does "arise under" federal law in some sense,
even under law that is only jurisdictional. The interest directly
generates the power. Once the power is exercised, even if only
by an allowance of jurisdiction to the state courts, the states
come under the obligations imposed upon them by the Supremacy Clause. The limits of national interest are also the first
limits on national power.
But the power of Congress over federal courts seems to
present a harder question. We have nearly two centuries of
debate on the extent to which Article I11 stands in the way of
Congress. We have come to suppose that federal jurisdiction
cannot constitutionally "arise under" a purely jurisdictional
~ t a t u t e . ~Fortunately,
"
Congress is generally able to confer
federal jurisdiction when the national interest so requires,
because it is usually possible to argue that some substantive
policy underlies and explains what appears to be at first blush
a purely jurisdictional national interest. When Congress confers jurisdiction over unfederalized cases, I would also argue

237. See infra note 253.
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that inchoate national substantive policy, not embodied in law,
may and often does empower Congress to do so.238
But it should not be necessary for Congress to manifest its
substantive concerns in substantive law in order to grant jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 111. Indeed, let me inch
out a bit further on this hitherto-unoccupied limb to suggest
that there also may be national policies which are wholly jurisdictional in nature and which may also empower Congress. The
widely-held view endorsed by the Court in ~ e s a ~and
~ '
jurisdiction cannot constitutionally
~ e r l i n d e n ~ ~ ~ - t hfederal
at
"arise under" a purely jurisdictional statute-is a fallacy.

A. The Party-Protective Paradox
At this point a most intriguing paradox presents itself. If
we try to suppose that a purely jurisdictional inchoate national
interest-without more-can ground federal-question jurisdiction, a scary apparition will loom up before us, clanking its
chains, ominously threatening our whole line of thought. I
should give fair warning that this specter materializes whether
or not I can make it vanish.
Return with me for a moment to the agents-or-instrumentalities strand of thought in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States. The thinking there is that federal jurisdiction can be
grounded in a national interest in providing the option of a
presumptively more protective forum than the state provides,
for litigation involving federal officers or instrumentalities.
If Congress wishes to assert a national party-protective
interest by creating a head of jurisdiction, it is hard to believe
that it cannot do so. To the extent this power of Congress
seems evident, we wiIl think that-whatever its rationale-the

238. Thus, for example, in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(as amended), there is exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal tort claims against
the United States. I do not doubt the constitutionality of this jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the liability is under the law of a state. Congress can provide a
protective forum for tort claims against the United States, even claims governable
by state law. Section 2074 of the same Title provides (with exceptions for punitive
damages in death cases and for interest) that "The United States shall be liable
. . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances." And 28 U.S.C. 5 2674 (1988), dealing with punitive damages in
death cases, refers to the Yaw of the place where the act or omission occurred."
The language of these sections has always been construed under the predecessor
legislation as requiring state law. Richards v. United States, 369 US. 1 (1962).
239. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).
240. Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t 495.
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Supreme Court got it about right in Red Cross. To be sure,
Justice Souter cannot persuade us, any more than he persuaded Justice Scalia, that the fragment of statutory text mentioning "federal courts" matters; if the jurisdictional statute is
unconstitutional it cannot matter what the statute says. And it
cannot matter either that there exists a threshold "ingredient"
of federal law in every case by or against the Red Cross, the
ingredient of the Red Cross's juridical capacity. That is a nonissue; it was decided long ago and is a matter of stare decisis.
Justice Souter was right not to rely on it in this context. What
does seem to matter in Red Cross is the national interest in
furnishing a presumptively protective forum for state-law litigation that could threaten the assets and even the viability of a
federally chartered instrumentality performing a vital national
service.
But this party-protective argument seems to prove too
much. The diversity jurisdiction of federal courts is a partyprotective jurisdiction. An identifiable party-protective national
policy sustains the diversity jurisdiction. Does this mean that,
paradoxically, the diversity jurisdiction "arises under" federal
law? To the extent we see that as an appalling question, we are
going to think that the Supreme Court got it wrong in Red
Cross. There was nothing in that case except the nation's party-protective interest to support-in a way that would convince
us-the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction over the Red
Cross.
For those whom a national party-protective interest cannot
ground federal-question jurisdiction, then, it may seem that the
Supreme Court got it about right in Mesa. They will overlook
Justice O'Connor's consideration of other national interests in
that case, and be content to read Mesa as declining to acknowledge the power of Congress to act in an identified national
interest when that interest is merely a party-protective one.
The argument from this position is that a national party-protective interest is without constitutional significance. To see it
otherwise would be, in effect, to say that even diversity cases
"arise under" federal law. Those for whom such a proposition
can only seem perverse are not falling into the trap of supposing that diversity cases necessarily arise under state law. But
they would argue that the judicial power that Article I11 extends to diversity cases is separate and distinct from the power
it extends to cases "arising under" federal law. They would
argue that these categories cannot be collapsed. They feel that
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diversity cases do not "arise under" the diversity statute for
purposes of Article 111, not only because there is no need for
such interpretive agility, since diversity jurisdiction is authorized independently in Article 111, but simply because no one
ever supposed diversity cases to be cases "arising under" federal law, and there seems to be no good reason for starting to
think so now.
There you have the problem. If you tend to think that Red
Cross was right but also think that diversity cases do not "arise
under" the federal diversity statute for purposes of Article 111, I
think I have shown you that for you the problem of state law in
federal courts is not going to be resolved any time soon. That is
not because, as Justice Frankfurter
the diversity
jurisdiction exhausts all of the power Congress has over cases
arising under state law; it does not.242Rather, it is because
you are not prepared to say there is constitutional federal-question jurisdiction over diversity cases. Sooner or later you will
conclude from this that a federal case cannot constitutionally
"arise under" when the only national interest in its doing so is
a party-protective interest. You will then, in the good company
of the United States Supreme Court, try to explain Red Cross
some other way.
But for a few intrepid readers for whom thinking the unthinkable is good sport, let me press the argument just to see
how far it will go. Let me broach the question whether it is
really unbearable to suppose that the diversity statute "arises
under" federal law. Doesn't it, after all?243It is an act of Congress like any other. Congress has plenary power over the
extent to which federal courts can invoke it.2MIn every case
the Supreme Court must have Article I11 power to review the
proper exercise of diversity jurisdiction, and it does so.245In
reviewing the propriety of diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court does not exercise diversity jurisdiction; it exercises feder241. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U S . 448, 460, 475
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
242. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is a counter-example. So are the
assertions of jurisdiction tested in Osborn, American Nat'l Red Cross, and Marathon Pipe Line. See supra notes 160-64, 204-08, 213-17 and accompanying text;
note 92.
243. For a valiant recent struggle with this apparent anomaly, see Steven A.
Childress, Judicial Review and Diversity Jurisdiction: Solving an Irrepressible Erie
Mystery, 47 SMU L. REV. 271 (1994).
244. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 9. 1; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
245. E.g., cases cited supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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al-question jurisdiction. No Congress has given the Court appellate jurisdiction over diversity cases as such; the Court
hears cases about the proper scope of the diversity jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts in its "arising under" jurisdiction,
because the existence and proper exercise of federal statutory
diversity jurisdiction present questions of federal law.
It is true that the Supreme Court has no power over the
merits in issues governed by nonfederal
But the Supreme Court's appellate Article I11 power over diversity cases is
co-extensive with and limited by the same national jurisdictional interest that justifies the jurisdictional grant. This is a clear
example of the fact we have been so reluctant to admit, that a
mere jurisdictional statute can "arise under" federal law for
purposes of Article 111.
So it is a fallacy to say that federal jurisdiction cannot
constitutionally "arise under" a purely jurisdictional federal
statute. In fact, it always does. The familiar but anomalous tag
of jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction is a superficial way of delineating this phenomenon because it lacks explanatory power,
and fails to capture the obligation of the federal courts to decide the jurisdictional issue in conformity with the limits of the
national interest, a duty they share with state courts when the
nation allocates similar jurisdiction to those courts.

B. A Test Impossible to Fail?
The general theory of the jurisdictional power of Congress
which I have been trying to set out is not most accurately described as an "Article I" theory. Rather, it is a product of substantive due process thinking. It is interest-analytic, and has to
do with the rational bases of exercises of sovereign power.
In this reasoning, then, the national interest is the effective measure of the power of Congress over state-law cases in
federal as well as in state courts. An alternative hypothesis
might be that Congress could vest jurisdiction over nonfederal
cases in state courts more easily than it could in federal courts,
since in state courts no one cares whether or not cases "arise
under" federal law for purposes of Article 111. But the source of
the power of Congress over state courts, which we now understand, may suggest to us, rather, that the effective measure of

246. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Of course this is true
whether those issues arise in diversity or in any other head of federal jurisdiction.
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the power of Congress over state-law cases in federal courts
also is the national interest; that the "arising under" language
of Article I11 should have no narrower meaning.
The conclusion that a party-protective interest can sustain
a grant of federal jurisdiction under Article I11 would not require a conclusion that Mesa v. California247was wrongly decided. It will be remembered that in Mesa the Court struck
down under Article I11 an application of an apparently partyprotective jurisdictional grant, the federal officer-removal statute. In her opinion for the Court Justice O'Connor acknowledged the potential national interests in protecting federal officials from local biases, and in furnishing a forum for trial of a
federal defense. She found no jurisdiction because these interests simply were not invoked on the facts. Any merely potential
national jurisdictional interest was outweighed by other, limiting national
The reader will at once take the altogether lawyerly view
that the test of national interest is so all-capacious and elastic
as to amount to no test at all. That the national interest is allcapacious and elastic is undoubtedly the case. Our Commerce
Clause jurisprudence establishes that. But that does not mean
that it is not the test of the power of Congress, or that Congress will never fail that test. If minimal scrutiny for rational
basis is what Article I11 in fact requires, the limiting case, I
would submit, ought to have been Verlinden.249
As we have seen, the national interest in furnishing a
regulated forum for suits in this country against foreign sovereigns when such suits are actionable in this country does not
support the furnishing of a forum for such suits when they are
not otherwise actionable in this country. When both parties are
foreign, even a party-protective interest cannot be attributed to
the United States; only a national interest in the merits could

247. 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
248. Id. a t 137-38.
249. See also Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800) (holding under
Article III's diversity grants that there could be no state-law action in federal court
between aliens). Arguably the ongoing litigation of several other Nigerian cement
claims in federal court in New York, some of which did involve American interests,
see, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 310-13 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982), justified an extension of jurisdiction over Verlinden's case. But the Second Circuit found no basis for
jurisdiction. Verlinden, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
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justify suit in this country when both parties are foreign. Indeed, nothing supported jurisdiction in Verlinden.
There have arisen numerous other attractive theories purporting to justify federal jurisdiction over state-law cases, and I
need not go over all that ground; we have said enough to enable us to see that no theory intended to overcome only the
constraints of Article I11 is likely to be a useful general theory
of power applicable in both sets of courts. Even if you extended
such a theory-I suppose the theory of "protective jurisdict i ~ n " ~is
" probably the most appealing candidate-to support
250. Although writers do not often take note of the usage, "protective jurisdiction" often refers simply to any grant of federal jurisdiction which, like the diversity jurisdiction, depends upon the nature of the parties rather than on the subject
matter of the cases. Paul Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts,
53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184 (1953).
The "theory" of "protective jurisdiction" is usually thought to be a bit more
complex. I n the simplest variant of this more complex thinking, the theory stands
for the proposition that federal courts have Article I11 power when Congress affords
federal jurisdiction over an area of law without regulating it substantively. See
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The thinking here is that the law that the cases will then
"arise under7' for purposes of Article I11 is the jurisdictional grant itself. This reasoning is sometimes supported by the argument that the greater substantive power
subsumes the lesser jurisdictional power of Congress. The policy argument is also
sometimes made that a grant of federal protective jurisdiction over a state-law case
is much less intrusive than federalization of the substantive issues. Of course, affording a special state forum might be thought to be the least intrusive federal
approach imaginable.
The Supreme Court has noted, but never relied upon, the theory of "protective
jurisdiction." See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995)
(speculating that jurisdiction over a personal-injuries claim would exist in cases
removed under the 1988 amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, even if the
defendant employee was eventually held not to have been acting within the scope
of her employment, under a combined "ingredientn and "pendent jurisdiction" theory, the scope-of-employment issue furnishing the ingredient); id. a t 2237 n.11 (citing Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 549 (1983)); see also Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137
(1989) (seeing no need to adopt the theory); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496 (1983) (suggesting, in my view erroneously, that purely
jurisdictional statutes cannot ground federal-question jurisdiction for purposes of
Article 111). For one of the few of Justice Frankfurter's effusions with which I find
myself in agreement, a t least for a couple of sentences, see Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
a t 474-75 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (" 'Protective jurisdiction' is a misused label
. . . properly descriptive of safeguarding some of the indisputable, staple business
of the federal courts. It is a radiation of an existing jurisdictionn).
From the enormous literature on the subject not otherwise mentioned in this
Article, see generally John T. Cross, Viewing Federal Jurisdiction Through the
HALL L. REV. 530 (1993); John E. KenneLooking Glass of Bankruptcy, 23 SETON
dy, Federal Jurisdiction, 19 TEX.TECH L. REV. 603 (1988); William R. Casto, The
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law
of Nations, 18 CONN.L. REV. 467 (1986); Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One
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an act of Congress granting jurisdiction to both sets of courts in
eases not arising under federal law, what would you add to the
requirement of an identified national interest in furnishing a
forum on the facts of the case? Certainly, in the absence of
such an interest no conceivable theory could sustain the jurisdictional grant.

C. Whatever Happened to Article III?
Some commentators will object to "the national interest" as
a test of the power of Congress in the context of a jurisdictional
grant and insist that something more, some further test, must
be imposed by Article 111. Article I11 has been throwing litigants out of court for over 200 years, and it will go on doing so.
History has taken it seriously, and no piece of academic theorizing is likely to make a jot of difference.
What is it, then, that Article I11 requires? Chief Justice
Marshall long ago in Osborn v. Bank interpreted Article I11 as
requiring only some small item of substantive federal law. We
may not have believed this "ingredient" theory of Article I11
before Verlinden, but after Verlinden that is the reinvigorated
and now orthodox position. Verlinden is pitched squarely on the
substantive threshold "ingredient" of foreign sovereign immunity.251By insisting on at least this substantive "ingredient,"
Verlinden strongly implies that under Article I11 a federal case
cannot "arise under" a purely jurisdictional statute.
Some
and writers2" rely also on The Genesee

Constitutional Case:" Procedural rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1399 (1983); Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The
Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933 (1982). The classic articles
include, apart from the Mishkin article already cited, David P. Currie, The Federal
Courts and The American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1968); Alexander M.
Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.PROBS.216,
224-25 (1948).
On protective jurisdiction for cases of mass tort, see generally Erwin
Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1990); George Conway, Note, Protective Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conferring Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in ConL. REV. 710 (1971).
sumer Class Actions, 69 MICH.
251. Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t 495, 496.
252. See, e.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S.121, 136 (1989); Verlinden, 461 US.
480, 495-96 (dealing with the Second Circuit's reading of the cases). The Verlinden
Court itself did not quite make this mistake, although, assuming the Second
Circuit's reading to be correct, Chief Justice Burger did distinguish the Great

810

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

Chief v. ~ i t z h u g h ~for
~ *the proposition that a case cannot
arise under a naked jurisdictional grant, even if enacted pursuant to Congress's Commerce power. But the Verlinden Court
itself was quick to distinguish the case before it from The
Genesee Chief, and in any event correctly saw that that case
. ~ ~that
~ grand old
would not bear such an i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ n In
admiralty case, the nub of the Supreme Court's difficulty was
its own previous interpretation of the scope of Article I11 jurisdiction in admiralty cases.
In The Thomas Jefferson,256Justice Story, writing for the
Court and relying on his own opinion on circuit in De Lovio v.
had limited the constitutional admiralty jurisdiction
to the "ebb and flow of the tides."258But by the time of The
Thomas Jefferson, the jurisdiction that had seemed so expansive to Story in De Lovio v. Boit had become much too narrow.
Even Story queried whether the jurisdiction might be extended
by Congress to take in the great inland seas and western rivLakes Act from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. He reasoned that the former was an attempt to pass off a grant of admiralty jurisdiction under the interstate commerce power, whereas the latter was grounded on the power of Congress
over international commerce, and on its foreign relations power as well. Verlinden,
461 U.S. a t 493. The trouble with the Great Lakes Act, though, is not that The
Genesee Chief declared it unconstitutional, but rather that The Genesee Chief made
it obsolete. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform And Article III
Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAML. REV. 169, 225 (1990) (stating that "the Supreme
Court has explicitly held that Congress may not legislatively expand federal court
jurisdiction through a purely jurisdictional statute passed pursuant to the Article I
power over interstate commerce") (citing Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136
(1989) and, for the same, but implicit, proposition, The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1851)). For a different exposition of the Court's position in The Genesee Chief, see infra text accompanying note 263; cf. supra note
228 on Panama u. Johnson. For a different exposition of the Court's position in
Mesa, see supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text; infra note 281 and accompanying text. For a refutation of language in Mesa suggesting on the strength of
an ancient case that federal-question jurisdiction cannot arise under a jurisdictional
grant, see infra notes 264-75 and accompanying text.
254. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451-53 (1851).
255. Verlinden, 461 U S . a t 495, 496.
256. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) (Story, J.).
257. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). One gleans from Story's sweeping
language in De Lovio that he imagined that his tidewater test was carving out an
enormous jurisdiction for federal admiralty; he seems to have been trying to draw
the commercial life of the nation, then largely maritime, into the federal courts. As
we can see from his even more disastrous opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 4 1 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), Story was still trying to draw the commercial life of the nation into
the federal courts in 1842, and yet for all his intellect he was still too much of a
creature of his time to invoke sufficient federal power.
258. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. a t 429.
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A delegation from Congress accepted Story's invitation,
approaching Story himself for help. It was Story himself who
drafted the Great Lakes
trying to patch up the tidewater difficulty; he even submitted the draR bill to each of his
brethren on the Court to review and approve before sending it
on to its sponsors in Congress.261Story drafted the Great
Lakes Act expressly under the commerce power to avoid the
argument that the Act added cases to the admiralty jurisdiction; adding to the admiralty jurisdiction is always textually
awkward because "all" of the jurisdiction is granted already.262But by the time The Genesee Chief came before the
Supreme Court, the Justices had reconsidered the whole position. Back in 1852 the Commerce power seemed inadequate to
them, on reflection, to authorize the needed federal jurisdiction
over intrastate admiralty cases. So in The Genesee Chief the
Court simply leapfrogged over Story's Great Lakes Act. The
Court explained that the true test of admiralty jurisdiction
under Article I11 had never been tidewater, as the Court had
mistakenly supposed, but had been navigable water all
along.263In this, the Court was not impermissibly adding
more cases to "all cases" in admiralty, jurisdiction over which
was given in Article 111; no, the Court was merely correcting its
own interpretive error. This was a master-stroke, but The

259. Whether, under the power to regulate commerce between the States,
Congress may not extend the remedy, by the summary process of the
Admiralty, to the case of voyages on the western waters, it is unnecessary for us to consider. If the public inconvenience, from the want
of a process of an analogous nature, shall be extensively felt, the
attention of the Legislature will doubtless be drawn to the subject.
Id. at 430 (Story, J.).
260. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726.
ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM
261. The story is told in DAW W. ROBERTSON,
106-16 (1971); Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty
Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (1954).
262. U.S. CONST.art. 111, 8 2; Judiciary Act of 1789 8 9, 1 Stat. 73. The opposite problem was the subject of Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
There, the railway challenged the constitutionality of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
8 688 (1988), which creates a cause of action in negligence for injured seamen
against their employers. Congress intended that Jones Act cases in federal courts
be pleaded under the statutory federal-question jurisdiction. The railway argued
that the Jones Act thus took these maritime cases away from the admiralty, which
was supposed to have jurisdiction over "all" maritime cases. But the Supreme
Court managed to sustain the Act by holding that it implicitly made these new
cases concurrently pleadable under federal admiralty jurisdiction.
263. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 452.
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Genesee Chief simply does not speak to the question whether a
case can "arise under" a jurisdictional grant.
In Mesa v. California, Justice O'Connor also referred to the
ancient case of Mossman v. H i g g i n ~ o nas
~ ~holding
~
that
"pure jurisdictional statutes which seek to do nothing more
than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases cannot
~ ~ ~that is not
support Art. I11 'arising under' j u r i s d i ~ t i o n . "But
what Mossman was about, any more than it was what The
Genesee Chief was about.
Mossman held, per curiam, that the statutory grant of
jurisdiction to federal circuit courts in cases in which "an alien
is a party"266could not constitutionally be applied, within the
meaning of the diversity language of Article 111. Mossman was
a case in which both parties were foreigners. As far as the
opinion in Mossman goes it is quite right and I have no quarrel
with it. The whole of the Court's opinion can be set out in a
footnote.267As you can see, the opinion in Mossman is utterly
silent on the "arising under" language of Article 111.
Between the report of the case by Dallas268and the arguments of counsel, one can glean that in the circuit court Mossman was an action in rem to foreclose on a mortgage of land in
Georgia.269No one would have dreamed that the case "arose
under" any other law than Georgia's; the Supreme Court took
judicial notice of Georgia law.270Mossman cannot be cited for
the proposition that Congress, having identified a national

264. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800) (per curiam).
265. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (selectively quoting from
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Verlinden, 461 US. a t 496).
266. First Judiciary Act of 1789, 11.
267. By the COURT: "The decisions, on this subject, govern the present
case; and the 11th section of the judiciary act can, and must, receive
a construction, consistent with the constitution. It says, it is true, in
general terms, that the Circuit Court shall have cognizance of suits
'where an alien is a party;' but as the legislative power of conferring
jurisdiction on the federal Courts, is, in this respect, confined to suits
between citizens and foreigners, we must so expound the terms of the
law, as to meet the case, 'where, indeed, an alien is one party,' but a
citizen is the other. Neither the constitution, nor the act of congress,
regard, on this point, the subject of the suit, but the parties. A description of the parties is, therefore, indispensable to the exercise of
jurisdiction. There is here no such description; and, of course, The
writ of error must be quashed."
Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) a t 14.
268. Oddly, Dallas represented Mossman also. Id. a t 13.
269. Id. at 12.
270. Id. at 13.
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interest in conferring a head of federal-question jurisdiction,
cannot do so.
On the other hand, the "arising under" clause of Article I11
might well have sustained jurisdiction on the particular facts.
The mortgagor of the Georgia land in question had been its
original owner. In 1778, during the Revolutionary War, Georgia
expelled the owner as a loyalist and confiscated the land. The
English creditor apparently sued virtually every surviving
holder in the post-confiscation chain of title.271But the English creditor failed t o challenge the validity of the confiscation
itself under the Peace Treaty of 1783, which the debtor had
pleaded in bar. The creditor raised that federal question only
belatedly and regretfully at oral argument before the Supreme
It would be very hard to argue that there was no national
interest in enforcing debts held by English creditors in the
wake of the Revolutionary War, even as against English debtors, if security for the debt was land in this country. One of the
reasons the Federalists supported the establishment of federal
diversity courts in the first place was to assure lenders abroad
that the nation would enforce obligations to foreigners flowing
from their private investments here.273To be sure, pro-debtor
sentiment in 1789 was a t least as strong. But my point is that
the problem was a national one, certainly insofar as it concerned the states' wartime confiscations of loyalists' lands. That
was one of the very problems the Peace Treaty of 1783 was
supposed to resolve. Of course Congress had Article I11 power
to create a forum for hearing claims "arising under" the Treaty;
apparently Congress did create a forum for federal decision of
questions on the validity of a treaty.274Certainly under the

271. Apparently only Mossman showed up. He was the surviving executor of
the second owner in the post-confiscation chain of title. But the second owner had
resold the land to a third. The English creditor acknowledged that Mossman was
not a proper party, but argued that the action was in the nature of a n action in
rem and should go forward anyway. Dallas does not report whether Georgia's sale
of the land pre-dated or post-dated the Treaty of 1783.
272. Mossman, 4 U.S.(4 Dall.) a t 13 (argument of Tilghman and Reed for the
original plaintiffs).
273. See supra note 29.
274. Counsel for the debtors cited an act of Congress, apparently providing for
direct removal to the Supreme Court of questions on the validity of a treaty:
The jurisdiction of the federal Courts (US.CONST. ART. I11 s. 2.) is
not where a question arises, that may be affected by a treaty, but where
a case arises under a treaty; and if a question on the validity of a treaty,
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reasoning of Osborn and Verlinden, a threshold federal "ingredient''-the effect of the Treaty-would ground Article I11 jurisdiction in every such case. Justice Story used the Treaty in
similar fashion to sustain the Supreme Court's former jurisdiction in another, much more famous litigation flowing from a
state's confiscation of a loyalist's land, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee .275
What is helping us in our understanding of the cases,
plainly, is that we are looking to the national interest as we
can glean it on the facts of the particular case. Article I11 can
be taken to reflect or subsume national adjudicatory interests.
If the Supreme Court were suddenly, unanimously, to see Article I11 as merely reflecting the national interests that underlie
it, and were to consider the national interest directly in Article
I11 cases, I think it fair to say, based on the analyses we have
made here, that little, if anything, would be lost.
The greater danger, it seems to me, is that this will not
happen, and that Article I11 will continue to be deployed without regard to the national interest. We should not have to read
cases like Verlinden, in which a nodding Court acts against its
every characteristic instinct and every dictate of reason and
substantive due process, and relegates to statutory tests the job
of preserving the courts of this country fkom universal jurisdiction over the world's grievances against sovereigns other
than the United States.276We should not have to read cases
like Marathon Pipe Line,277in which the vital services of the
nation's courts in their bankruptcy jurisdiction are disrupted on
the incredible reasoning that in the absence of diversity, Article
I11 requires private state-law, but not private federal-law
claims,"* to be heard by judges with life tenure.279 We
should not have to read cases in which no majority rationale
can be found to support diversity jurisdiction in a controversy

arises in a state Court, there is a special provision for transferring it to
the Supreme Court; 1 vol. 61. s. 22. But, in the present instance, it does
not appear that any question can arise under the treaty; for, it is not
referred to, directly, nor indirectly, in any part of the record.
Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 13-14.
275. 14 US. (1 Wheat.) 304, 356 (1816).
276. See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
277. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982); see discussion supra notes 69, 93.
278. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. at 84.
279. Id. at 85-87.
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between a citizen of a state and a citizen of the District of Col~rnbia.~~'
And if the best way to capture the national interest in
preserving federal courts from having to entertain the local
prosecution of every criminally negligent post-office driveP8'
is to conclude that Article I11 stands in the way, it seems to me
that the Supreme Court could not do better than to summon
Article I11 to the aid of the courts below. As long as the Court
does so in the light of reason and with an eye on the competing
national interests at stake, as it did in Mesa, it must be doing
it right.

VIII. REMARKS
IN CLOSING
We now have a reasonably general theory. At its narrowest
it is a theory of the power of Congress to confer jurisdiction
over nonfederal cases upon the state courts. At a more general
level it is a theory of the power of Congress to confer nonfedera1 business upon federal courts as well. We see that the first
determinative factor is, and ought to be, the existence of an
identifiable national interest in devolving such jurisdiction
upon the states.
The inquiry into governmental interest is familiar to Arnerican courts and lawyers. It derives from the ordinary purposive
reasoning characteristic of the common law. Courts tend to
seek reasons for the common-law rules they apply, and purposes behind the statutory provisions they apply, to ensure that
applications of law on the particular facts will be reasonable.
This sort of inquiry is familiar, too, across the range of constitutional jurispruden~e.~"The inquiry into governmental interest is seen in its most fundamental form when the Supreme
Court imposes a requirement of minimal rationality upon law.
We traditionally have conceived of such rationality review as a
matter of substantive due process.
In the absence of an identifiable national interest in conferring a particular jurisdiction over state-law matters upon
state courts, the nation has no power to act, and no other limiting tests are salient. Of course there are extrinsic constraints
upon the rational exercise of national power to confer jurisdic280. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 333 U.S. 860
(1948).
281. Cf.Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
282. See supra notes 131, 137-45 and accompanying text.
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tion upon the states, as there are upon any exercise of governmental power. But in the presence of a national interest in
conferring a certain jurisdiction over nonfederal questions upon
the states, no other theory is needed to support the jurisdictional grant.
The theory extends usefully to the more familiar problem
of the power of Congress to devolve jurisdiction upon the federal courts over state-law questions in nondiversity cases. To the
extent Article I11 is serving as a surrogate for this theory, we
can reason more clearly if we reason directly from the national
interest. Under this theory as a theory of jurisdiction it becomes a matter of no concern in either set of courts whether a
particular grant of jurisdiction by Congress is accompanied by
substantive federal law, or even substantive national policy. As
the numerous heads of federal party-protective jurisdiction
make plain, rational national interests are possible even if they
are almost wholly jurisdictional. Thus, unless it is a rational
purpose of Article I11 to frustrate national jurisdictional policy,
an identified national jurisdictional policy should support jurisdiction in federal as well as state courts; no additional theory
in the nature of a theory of "protective jurisdiction" is needed.
This reflection suggests that in itself Article I11 probably
should not be seen as imposing some further constraint upon
Congress than the requirement of acting within an identified
national interest.
One constraint upon the power of Congress which does go
beyond minimal rationality may be viewed as intrinsic to this
theory. Today we understand that whatever the underlying
policy that we glean from a rule or statute, that policy is likely
to be limited and conditional. Usually we can hypothesize countervailing policies which explain certain features of the case
law or legislation. Moreover, we note the existence of relevant
more general governmental policies, which we find reflected in
other decisions and statutes, together with their bounds. Thus
it sometimes becomes necessary, however awkward or difficult
the process, to weigh countervailing policies in order to determine, if not the legitimacy of a jurisdictional grant, then its
feasibility as applied on the particular facts.
As a theory of jurisdiction in this federal system, this theory implies that once the nation allocates jurisdiction supported
by an identified national interest, concomitant judicial duties
arise under the Supremacy Clause, even under a purely jurisdictional act of Congress. This is true even in the intuitively
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limiting case of the states' concurrent jurisdiction over diversity
cases. However counter-intuitive the proposition may seem, we
have seen that the states have no option to forego their jurisdiction over their diversity case^.^"
The generalizability of the described theory is unsurprising
because it is the same general theory that is already implicitly
used both to explain and test other exercises of governmental
power. A government's power derives from and is limited by
that government's interests, in this country of course always
within any more exacting extrinsic constitutional constraints.
Using rational-basis scrutiny to test Article I11 jurisdiction
has the further advantage of making the power of Congress
congruent in state and federal courts when Congress seeks to
provide concurrent jurisdiction. If additional, prudential, constraints on the exercise of federal power seem appropriate,
history tells us that federal decisional law will supply them
whether or not the Constitution does.284
We have taken up a classic problem of federal courts
power of Congress to vest jurisdiction in federal
law-the
courts beyond the limits on federal judicial power imposed by
Article 111. By generalizing that problem to both sets of courts,
we have been able in large part to resolve it. Once one isolates
the problem from its usual Article I11 context, one is able to
identify the actual sources of, and limitations upon, the power
of the nation to vindicate national substantive policy through
allocations of adjudicatory power. The textual constraints of
Article I11 then can become more fully understood. Questions
"arise under" federal law, including jurisdictional questions,
across the broad field of national policy concerns.

283. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text; cf. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALEL.
J. 71, 89-90 (1984) (criticizing the abstention doctrines as unauthorized departures
from jurisdictional statutes).

